There has been a lot of discussion recently of policy proposals around monitorability, such as Redwood's proposal and my counter-proposal. I'd like to say a bit more generally about how I'm thinking about monitorability. Note that nothing here is an official Anthropic position; these are just my personal thoughts.

First, a categorization. I currently think about four different types of monitorability:

Control Monitorability: the extent to which Control and monitoring techniques would likely catch catastrophic sabotage actions, like escaping a sandbox or setting up a rogue internal deployment. We can measure this via reference to sabotage evaluations like LinuxArena or any evaluation that measures the model's capability to take dangerous actions like escaping a sandbox while looking to a monitor like it's doing some innocuous task (like a cyber eval).
Auditing Monitorability: the extent to which alignment audits, evaluations, and test deployments would likely incriminate a systematically misaligned model (e.g. a schemer). We can measure this via reference to the model's capability to consistently distinguish between our most realistic alignment audits/evals and real internal deployment cases where it would have an opportunity to do something catastrophic.
Training Monitorability: the extent to which reward models [...]

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First published:
October 22nd, 2026

Source:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/zAczYuHQS6jdG5DTg/monitorability-evaluations-and-policy-proposals

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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.

“Monitorability evaluations and policy proposals” by evhub

LessWrong (30+ Karma)

“Monitorability evaluations and policy proposals” by evhub