This work is hosted on MCNAIR, but does not reflect the views of my employer or the Center.

In the last couple of weeks, domestic coordination has looked more likely. Therefore, I am increasingly concerned about the Chinese government's (and various Chinese labs’) incentives over the next 6 to 18 months with respect to international coordination on mitigating potential existential risks from powerful AI. In this series, I attempt to model these incentives and what they imply for Chinese AI policy.

In Part I, I argue that the Chinese AI outlook is very bad, and that by default China will enter takeoff far behind the US, possibly leading the way to disempowerment.
In Part II, I will walk through several domestic policy interventions the CCP may use to improve the situation, and analyze whether these are likely to be sufficient.
In Part III, I will discuss foreign policy interventions such as sabotage and escalating tensions, excluding bilateral treaties or other international coordination.
In Part IV, I will describe some considerations on China's plate walking into hypothetical negotiations for an AI treaty with the United States.

The situation is quite bad

Perhaps the most important (and underrated) fact about [...]

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Outline:

(01:24) The situation is quite bad

(07:10) The US-China capabilities gap will continue growing

The original text contained 3 footnotes which were omitted from this narration.

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First published:
September 30th, 2026

Source:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/fDE6k8SGr9ANtMFcj/by-default-chinese-ai-falls-very-behind

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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.

“By default, Chinese AI falls very behind” by Parv Mahajan

LessWrong (30+ Karma)

“By default, Chinese AI falls very behind” by Parv Mahajan