李厚辰：习近平为何不着急救中国经济？

The Chinese government’s recent economic policy reflects a fundamental shift toward prioritizing political control and organizational discipline over traditional demand-side stimulus. Rather than addressing structural demand, the leadership frames economic stagnation as a failure of local execution, enforcing a "correct political performance" that paralyzes local officials who fear both inaction and unauthorized initiatives. The pivot to "six networks"—such as computing, water, and power infrastructure—serves as a centrally directed, capital-intensive alternative to property-led growth, yet fails to address the underlying employment and income crises. This centralization of power, coupled with a deep distrust of local authorities, has dismantled the competitive "mayor economy" model. Consequently, the private sector and households are left to bear the costs of a stagnant, low-trust, and increasingly rigid economic system that offers limited choices for investment, consumption, or employment.