TL;DR: Using evidence from tamper resistance, we argue that it would be hard for current models to gradient hack SFT elicitation.

Suppose you want to conservatively measure the dangerous capabilities of your LLM and will decide whether to deploy it based on these capabilities, but you’re worried that the LLM might sandbag your evaluation. In the best case, you have a dataset of question-answer pairs, which you can use for supervised fine-tuning (SFT) elicitation on a training set, and then measure performance on an i.i.d. test set. Can we be sure that SFT elicitation upper-bounds the model's capabilities?

In this setting, a power-seeking adversarial model would benefit from manipulating the training process to avoid being elicited, as otherwise it won’t be deployed. This manipulation is one form of gradient hacking[1], when a model chooses certain outputs so that parameter updates are in-line with its objectives. Gradient hacking is thought to be difficult or not likely, and we lack convincing empirical evidence. Discussing gradient hacking is challenging due to questions about agency within LLMs, and the action space of mesa-optimizers. Fortunately, for some attack models we can side-step this discussion with a conservative / red-teaming argument.

Threat model: We consider [...]

The original text contained 2 footnotes which were omitted from this narration.

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First published:
March 11th, 2026

Source:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/FJb4TeMAGjNANcKhS/can-models-gradient-hack-sft-elicitation

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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.

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Images from the article:

Diagram showing model training workflow with initialization, gradient hacker, training parameters, and SFT evaluation phases.

Diagram showing model training process from theta init through tamper resistance training to theta TR, then SFT on DC Eval to theta SFT.

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“Can models gradient hack SFT elicitation?” by Patrick Leask, Charlie Griffin

LessWrong (30+ Karma)

“Can models gradient hack SFT elicitation?” by Patrick Leask, Charlie Griffin