Tl;dr

AI alignment has a culture clash. On one side, the “technical-alignment-is-hard” / “rational agents” school-of-thought argues that we should expect future powerful AIs to be power-seeking ruthless consequentialists. On the other side, people observe that both humans and LLMs are obviously capable of behaving like, well, not that. The latter group accuses the former of head-in-the-clouds abstract theorizing gone off the rails, while the former accuses the latter of mindlessly assuming that the future will always be the same as the present, rather than trying to understand things. “Alas, the power-seeking ruthless consequentialist AIs are still coming,” sigh the former. “Just you wait.”

As it happens, I’m basically in that “alas, just you wait” camp, expecting ruthless future AIs. But my camp faces a real question: what exactly is it about human brains[1] that allows them to not always act like power-seeking ruthless consequentialists? I find that existing explanations in the discourse—e.g. “ah but humans just aren’t smart and reflective enough”, or evolved modularity, or shard theory, etc.—to be wrong, handwavy, or otherwise unsatisfying.

So in this post, I offer my own explanation of why “agent foundations” toy models fail to describe humans, centering around a particular non-“behaviorist” [...]

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Outline:

(00:13) Tl;dr

(03:35) 0. Background

(03:39) 0.1. Human social instincts and Approval Reward

(07:23) 0.2. Hang on, will future powerful AGI / ASI by default lack Approval Reward altogether?

(10:29) 0.3. Where do self-reflective (meta)preferences come from?

(12:38) 1. The human intuition that it's normal and good for one's goals & values to change over the years

(14:51) 2. The human intuition that ego-syntonic desires come from a fundamentally different place than urges

(17:53) 3. The human intuition that helpfulness, deference, and corrigibility are natural

(19:03) 4. The human intuition that unorthodox consequentialist planning is rare and sus

(23:53) 5. The human intuition that societal norms and institutions are mostly stably self-enforcing

(24:01) 5.1. Detour into Security-Mindset Institution Design

(26:22) 5.2. The load-bearing ingredient in human society is not Security-Mindset Institution Design, but rather good-enough institutions plus almost-universal human innate Approval Reward

(29:26) 5.3. Upshot

(30:49) 6. The human intuition that treating other humans as a resource to be callously manipulated and exploited, just like a car engine or any other complex mechanism in their environment, is a weird anomaly rather than the obvious default

(31:13) 7. Conclusion

The original text contained 12 footnotes which were omitted from this narration.

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First published:
December 3rd, 2025

Source:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/d4HNRdw6z7Xqbnu5E/6-reasons-why-alignment-is-hard-discourse-seems-alien-to

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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.

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Images from the article:

When we compare “normal” motivations (a) with Approval Reward (b), the primary relation of object-level desires versus self-reflective meta-level desires (red arrows) is flipped. On the (a) side, we expect things like reflective consistency and goal-stabilization (cf. instrumental convergence). On the (b) side, we don’t (necessarily); instead we may encounter radical goal-changes upon reflection and self-modification, along with a broader willingness for goals to change.

Even if a young child wants to grow up to become a doctor, they can and will take appropriate goal-oriented actions to advance this long-term plan, such as practicing surgical techniques (left) and watching training videos (right).

Three-panel Simpsons meme with Bart, Homer, and Lisa discussing policing the police.

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“6 reasons why ‘alignment-is-hard’ discourse seems alien to human intuitions, and vice-versa” by Steven Byrnes

LessWrong (30+ Karma)

“6 reasons why ‘alignment-is-hard’ discourse seems alien to human intuitions, and vice-versa” by Steven Byrnes