1. Private order flow on Ethereum accounts for 10-20% of user transactions, which are not publicly visible and meant to protect users from MEV (Maximal Extractable Value).
2. Private orders may create MEV opportunities that only a select few searchers and builders can exploit to generate profits from backrunning.
3. Transaction observability differentiates between public visibility in the mempool and private submissions, greatly affecting front and backrunning risks for users.
4. There are private order flows where users can benefit from MEV revenue through auction-based systems, but these are also subject to targeting by privileged players.
5. A high percentage of MEV revenue is created from backrunning private orders, which is more cost-effective for searchers compared to traditional arbitrage because of lower gas and bribe payments.
6. The MEV ecosystem is potentially moving toward a dystopian future, where a small number of market players dominate MEV revenue by exploiting transaction observability.
7. The talk encourages reconsideration of the current system to prevent high entry barriers and unequal MEV revenue distribution.

Key questions the transcript answers:

How do private orders protect users from MEV on Ethereum?
- Users can submit their transactions directly to a builder's private RPC which keeps them hidden from public view, reducing the risk of being targeted for MEV.

How do searchers and builders profit from private orders?
- Select searchers and builders have access to the private orders, enabling them to exploit these transactions for profitable backrunning without the competitive costs of public MEV opportunities.

What impact does transaction observability have on MEV opportunities?
- Observability dictates who can see transactions and exploit MEV opportunities; those who can observe private orders can backrun with less competition.

What is the problem with the current MEV distribution system, according to Ye?
- The problem is the concentration of MEV revenue among a small number of privileged searchers and builders, which could set higher entry barriers and lead to an unequal and closed-off MEV ecosystem.

What solutions are implied for the MEV problem?
- The talk suggests a need for reevaluation and possible restructuring of the MEV system to allow for a more equitable distribution of revenue across different players in the market.

Core Takeaway:

The core problem described is the imbalance in MEV revenue distribution due to the privileged access to private order flows by a few market players, which can lead to backrunning and profit without significant costs. The consequences of not addressing this issue include a non-inclusive MEV ecosystem and potentially higher barriers of entry for new participants. To address the problem, Ye Wang suggests:

1. Increasing awareness of the hidden value in privately submitted transactions and the potential for these to create MEV opportunities for select parties.
2. Encouraging discussions on the fairness and accessibility of the MEV revenue distribution system.
3. Considering policy or structural changes that could democratize access to MEV opportunities and prevent a few players from dominating the marketplace.

Tags here: Etherum, MEV (Maximal Extractable Value), Ye Wang, transaction observability, private order flow, backrunning, blockchain security.

The New Era of Transaction Observability: Deciphering MEV's Shifting Value Landscape | Ye Wang

Higher Signal: Get Smarter. Faster.