Mitchell v. Wisconsin

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 23, 2019.
Decided on Jun 27, 2019.

Petitioner: Gerald P. Mitchell.
Respondent: State of Wisconsin.

Advocates:

Andrew R. Hinkel (for the Petitioner)
Hannah S. Jurss (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In May 2013, Gerald P. Mitchell was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. He became lethargic on the way to the police station, so the arresting officers took him to a hospital instead. An officer read him a statutorily mandated form regarding the state implied consent law, but Mitchell was too incapacitated to indicate his understanding or consent and then fell unconscious. Without a warrant, at the request of the police, hospital workers drew Mitchell’s blood, which revealed his blood alcohol concentration to be .222.

Mitchell was charged with operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol concentration. He moved to suppress the results of the blood test on the ground that his blood was taken without a warrant and in the absence of any exceptions to the warrant requirement. The state argued that under the implied-consent statute, police did not need a warrant to draw his blood. Many states, including Wisconsin, have implied consent laws, which provide that by driving a vehicle, motorists consent to submit to chemical tests of breath, blood, or urine to determine alcohol or drug content. The trial court sided with the state and allowed the results of the blood test into evidence. Mitchell was convicted on both counts.

Mitchell appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin with respect to the issue “whether the warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law...violates the Fourth Amendment.” The Supreme Court of Wisconsin accepted the certification and upheld the search 5–2, but without any majority for the rationale for upholding it.

Question

Does a statute that authorizes a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provide an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement?

Conclusion

A four-justice plurality of the Court concluded that when a driver is unconscious and cannot be given a breath test, the exigent-circumstances doctrine generally permits a blood test without a warrant. Justice Samuel Alito announced the judgment of the Court and delivered a plurality opinion.

Writing for himself, Chief Justice John Roberts, and Justices Stephen Breyer and Brett Kavanaugh, Justice Alito noted that blood alcohol concentration (BAC) tests are searches subject to the Fourth Amendment. As such, a warrant is generally required before police may conduct a BAC test, unless an exception applies. The “exigent circumstances” exception allows the government to conduct a search without a warrant “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” The Court has previously held that the fleeting nature of blood-alcohol evidence alone does not automatically qualify BAC tests for the exigent circumstances exception, but additional factors may bring it within the exception. For example, in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Court held that “the dissipation of BAC did justify a blood test of a drunk driver whose accident gave police other pressing duties, for then the further delay caused by a warrant application would indeed have threatened the destruction of evidence.” Similarly, a situation involving an unconscious driver gives rise to exigency because officials cannot conduct a breath test and must instead perform a blood test to determine BAC.

Under the exigent circumstances exception, a warrantless search is allowed when “there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” The plurality pointed to three reasons such a “compelling need” exists: highway safety is a “vital public interest,” legal limits on BAC serve that interest, and enforcement of BAC limits requires a test accurate enough to stand up in court.

The plurality suggested that on remand, Mitchell can attempt to show that his was an unusual case that fell outside the exigent circumstances exception (perhaps because police conceded that they had time to get a warrant to draw his blood).

Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment but would have applied a per se rule under which “the natural metabolization of alcohol in the blood stream creates an exigency once police have probable cause to believe the driver is drunk, regardless of whether the driver is conscious.”

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan joined. The dissent argued that the plurality “needlessly casts aside the established protections of the warrant requirement in favor of a brand new presumption of exigent circumstances.” Established precedent should determine the outcome in this case: unless there is too little time to do so, police officers must get a warrant before ordering a blood draw. The dissent also argued that the state statute “cannot create actual and informed consent that the Fourth Amendment requires.”

[18-6210] Mitchell v. Wisconsin

Supreme Court Oral Arguments