Hello everyone, a big thanks to all of you who joined the patreon and voted for this to be the next episode, you all are awesome. This is a part 2 about Hirohito’s responsibility during the wars of 1931-1945, so if you have not heard part 1, perhaps go do so, or maybe you just don’t care about 1931-1940 and just want to hear about the 1941-1945 period, hell by all means enjoy.

So last time we kind of left it on a bit of a dramatic cliff hanger. I spoke about Emperor Hirohito’s involvement in what was called at the time the “China Incident”. It was not an official declared war until December of 1941. We left off in 1940, Hirohito was struggling with a situation of juggling two things: 1) how the hell to finally end the China War 2) how to do it without receiving horrible ramifications from the international world. On July 22nd of 1940, Konoe was back and formed a second cabinet. Notably General Hideki Tojo went from vice to army Minister during this time. If you guys ever want a podcast on Hideki Tojo, let me know, he is one rather bizarre figure that's for sure. Konoe tackled his job by holding an imperial HQ government liaison conference. For 90 minutes everyone worked on a new national policy designed to exploit the international situation, IE: Germany bulldozing europe.

The result was a document on national policy dated July 27th. It shifted focus to the “southern area” IE: southeast asia and the Pacific if the China war did not end quickly. Its basis was to exploit the foreign nations that had their hands full in europe, France, Britain and the Netherlands. It called for an invasion of French Indochina to establish bases to launch assaults against the Dutch East Indies for natural resources if diplomatic means failed. It acknowledged if the Dutch East Indies were seized through military means, Japan would also seek to fight Britain, but not the US, instead Japan would prepare for a possible war with the Americans. To all of this Hirohito approved. The army also kept pressuring its desire to ally with Germany. Throughout 1939-1940 Hirohito rejected this idea, not because of any ideological differences, it was because of Germans anti aggression pact with the USSR. If Japan were to ally to Germany, Hirohito wanted it to be mutually to fight the USSR. The Navy likewise opposed allying to Germany because they believed it would force Britain and the US to increase their aid to Chiang Kai-shek.

However the Blitzkrieg changed everything. Everyone was shocked at how well Germany was doing. Prince Chichibu repeatedly argued with Hirohito to change his mind over the alliance idea. Then suddenly the Navy changed their mind and began favoring an alliance. This changed came about in June of 1940 when the France fell. The Navy changed their mind based on a few factors, a major component was the belief if Germany and the USSR were allied, than at least Japan would not have to worry about the USSR and could focus on the pacific. Both the IJA and the IJN believed Hitler would soon take Britain and thus there was a huge desire to join the new international order on the winning side. A third factor was a new clause in negotiations with Germany and Japan, that if they allied Japan would not automatically be drawn into a war with Britain against her will. Some in the navy also believed perhaps Germany could help their diplomatic situation with the Americans. So the army and navy were now both demanding an alliance with Germany, it was all up to hirohito.

At an imperial briefing on June 19th of 1940, Hirohito asked chief of staff Prince Kan’in and the Army Minister Hata “At a time when peace will soon come in the European situation, will there be a deployment of troops to the Netherlands Indies and French Indochina?” Such as question revealed Hirohito’s perception at the time that Germany was on the verge of victory and that he was gradually considering the deployment of troops in French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies as neither parent nation were in a position to defend their holdings. In regards to the China war, the Japanese sought to end leaks of materials getting into China from places like Hong Kong. Hirohito received reports indicated Britain would not accept closing the movement of materials into China via Hong Kong. The military acknowledged it would probably be required to invade Hong Kong and thus declare war on Britain. Upon hearing of this Hirohito remarked “Should that happen, I am sure America will use the method of an embargo, don’t you agree?” To this his lord of the privy seal, Kido reassured him stating “the nation must be fully resolved to resist to proceed cautiously and not to be dragged into events precipitated by the overseas agencies”.

Konoe’s second cabinet resolved to end the China war, construct a new order in greater east asia and to complete war preparations as a national defense state. On July 27th at a liaison conference a document was adopted, affirming a course of advancing to the south and to ally with Germany. Japan would incorporate the Dutch East Indies, British Malaya and other resource rich areas of Southeast Asia into its new order while simultaneously bolstering its relationship with the Axis states. After hearing and reading everything, Hirohito sanctioned it all. Thus Hirohito had sanctioned the preliminary actions that would set Japan into a collision course with the US.

In September Japan began sending troops into northern French Indochina after concluding its Tripartite alliance with Germany and Italy. Now Hirohito was briefed beforehand by Army Minister Tojo and other chiefs of staff about securing bases in northern French indochina. Hirohito agreed to this under the belief acquiring such bases would stop more leaked materials going into China and thus contribute to the fall of Chongqing. But Hirohito also sanctioned it under the full knowledge it was preparing the Nanshin-ron advance and that carried a risk of going to war with Britain and by proxy the US. Naturally he wanted to thwart any war breaking out with the US by it seems his officials had convinced him they could manage most of their plans without aggravating the US.

On July 29th with the German offensive aimed at finishing off Britain, Hirohito summoned his chiefs and vice chiefs of staff to the imperial HQ. He began to question the prospects of war with the US. Prince Fushimi replied “[u]nless we complete our domestic preparations, particularly the preparation of our material resources, I do not think we should lightly start war even if there is a good opportunity to do so.” Hirohito then asked if “the Army were planning to occupy points in India, Australia, and New Zealand.” But overall Hirohito seemed to be the most concerned about the US, Germany and the USSR. “Could Japan, obtain a victory in a naval battle with the United States as we once did in the Battle of the Japan Sea? . . . I heard that the United States will ban exports of oil and scrap iron [to Japan]. We can probably obtain oil from other sources, but don’t you think we will have a problem with scrap iron?” In regards to the USSR “If a Japan-Soviet nonaggression treaty is made and we advance to the south, the navy will become the main actor. Has the army given thought to reducing the size of its forces in that case? . . . How do you assess the future national power of Germany? . . . Both Germany and the Soviet Union are untrustworthy countries. Don’t you think there will be a problem if one of them betrays us and takes advantage of our exhaustion fighting the United States?I]t seems as though you people are thinking of implementing this plan by force because there is a good opportunity at this moment for resolving the southern problem even though some dangers are involved. . . . What does a good opportunity mean? [To this question Sawada replied: “For example, if a German landing in England commences.”] In that case wouldn’t the United States move to aid Britain? . . . Well, I’ve heard enough. I take it, in short, that you people are trying to resolve the southern problem by availing yourselves of today’s good opportunities.”

You can tell Hirohito understood the very real threat of an Anglo-American alliance and was very cautious. It seemed to Hirohito, that his officials were trying to take the limelight off the abysmal situation in China but emphasizing a southern advance. Well Americans response to the Japanese movement into northern French indochina was to see it as a direct threat. Something I have not paid much attention to was Hirohito’s decision making being the direct result of trying to mediate between competing entities, ie: the IJA and IJN. At this point in time the IJA and IJN top officials had the power to simply stop governmental functions from occurring altogether whenever they were displeased with a decision. As you can imagine the IJA and IJN were also competing for resources and political power. Thus Hirohito spent a lot of time and effort trying to formulate decisions that at a minimum kept the governance going.

In the end Hirohito sanctioned Imperial HQ army order number 458, ordering the area army to begin the entry into French Indochina. Thus once again Hirohito sanctioned aggression aboard. America began what it called a “moral embargo” on aircraft parts, scrap iron and aviation gasoline. This was one of many gradual steps America took to incrementally sanction Japan, while aiding China to keep it bogged down. Japan’s direct response was joining the Axis with a clause “to assist one another with all political, economic and military means if attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese conflict”. This clause was designed specifically to check Britain and the US. Hirohito knew this was a turning point carrying the possibility of war with the US. Later he would blame some officials and even his brothers Chichibu and Takamatsu, but not his own actions sanctioning the Axis pact.

Speaking of his brothers, at this time Chichibu got severely ill with tuberculosis and as a result retired from active public life, now Prince Takamatsu stood as next regent. Thus Takamatsu would begin reading reports and advise Hirohito. Takamatsu like Chichibu approved the Tripartite Pact and found his brother Hirohito’s performance lacking. Meanwhile Britain responded to the Tripartite pact by opening up the Burma road and America made a loan to Chiang Kai-shek.

The Soviets came to Japan for a neutrality pact and sweetened the deal by offering Soviet coal and oil concessions in North Sakhalin. Hirohito ratified the treaty on April 25th of 1941. 5 weeks later on June 5th, the Japanese ambassador to Berlin, General Oshima Hiroshi reported to Hirohito and the high command that Hitler was about to invade the Soviets. The Army high command sprang into action drafting plans to open a war with the Soviets while simultaneously advancing south into French Indochina. But many in the military also sought to wait until the time was ripe, and a rift emerged. Operation barbarossa commenced and on June 23rd the IJN high command gave their opinion that Japan should seize all military bases and airfields in southern French Indochina even at the risk of war with Britain and America. Can you say boy that escalated quickly?

There was obvious temptation to invade Siberia towards Lake Baikal, but at the same time the western powers were tightening sanctions on Japan, she needed resources. At this point Japan had been stuck in China for 4 years and 5 months, the army had expanded from 17 divisions totalling 250,000 men in july of 1937 to 51 divisions at 2.1 million men in December 8th of 1941. On July 2nd, 10 tens into Operation barbarossa, Konoe summoned an imperial conference to debate actions going forward. The consensus was that southern French Indochina needed to be taken and that it probably would not provoke the US going to war with Japan. Hirohito sanctioned it and on July 30th made a major operational intervention by advising General Sugiyama to build up forces in Manchukuo to prevent the Soviet Far Eastern Army.

Japan negotiated with Vichy France to allow Japanese troops to occupy southern parts of French Indochina. What was to be originally just 40,000 IJA forces turned into 185,000 and in response America increased sanctions and began preparing the Philippines for war. Roosevelt froze Japanese assets in the US on July 26th and by August the 1st a total embargo of oil and gasoline exports to Japan. Konoe’s cabinet, the military high command, pretty much everyone was shocked by how harsh the economic sanctions were. Emperor Hirohito told Sugiyama to halt mobilizing forces in Manchukuo and the army basically dropped all plans of attacking the USSR. A month after the US oil embargo suddenly the army had changed its mind to go all in on the southern advance. Britain likewise began sanctions against Japan and both Britain and the US managed to convince the Dutch to follow suit by refusing to sell oil to Japan. The Dutch even took it a step further and followed Americans lead in freezing Japanese assets.

Konoe was in full panic mode, be believed his ambassador to washington was a moron and sought to go in person to speak to Roosevelt. At 11:40am on August 4th Konoe spoke to Hirohito about the plan, but Washington kept making up excuses prolonging any meeting from taking place. Meanwhile Washington was building up its navy, and the IJN were stressing, in the words of Admiral Takagai “As time passes and this situation continues, our empire will either be totally defeated or forced to fight a hopeless war. Therefore we should pursue war and diplomacy together. If there is no prospect of securing our final line of national survival by diplomatic negotiations, we must be resolved to fight.” Hirohito understood the predicament full well, that each day Japan was wasting its oil reserves, if they were to strike it had to be quickly.

On september 3rd at a liaison conference it was decided Japan was to prepare for a war against the US, UK and Netherlands while simultaneously pursuing diplomacy. If diplomacy failed by early October the decision for war would be made. Konoe presented everything to Hirohito on September 5th and requested an imperial conference on the matter. The most important decision of his life was about to be made.

Now take a second to feel the moment. Germany’s invasion of the USSR was in its 6th week and not producing a decisive victory; Britain was still in the fight and the Japanese ambassador to London reported back Britain would allow Japan to maintain its great power status and exert influence in asia if they stayed out of the European War and “re-examined their current policy”. An olive branch. Hirohito had options is what I am arguing. He could stale things, he could mobilize units into Manchukuo to simply threaten the Soviet border, he could simply stay out of new wars, even it the China war would get worse, but try to profit from the situation in Europe. He could stop the southern advance, lose the chance to seize the resource in southeast asia, but perhaps the US, UK and Netherlands would lift some sanctions.

After speaking back and forth with Konoe while scolding Sugiyama here is a bit of their conversation:

Emperor: In the event we must finally open hostilities, will our operations have a probability of victory?

Sugiyama: Yes, they will.

Emperor: At the time of the China Incident, the army told me that we could achieve peace immediately after dealing them one blow with three divisions. Sugiyama, you were army minister at that time. . . .

Sugiyama: China is a vast area with many ways in and many ways out, and we met unexpectedly big difficulties. . . . [ellipses in original]

Emperor: Didn’t I caution you each time about those matters? Sugiyama, are you lying to me? Nagano: If Your Majesty will grant me permission, I would like to make a statement.

Emperor: Go ahead.

Nagano: There is no 100 percent probability of victory for the troops stationed there. . . . Sun Tzu says that in war between states of similar strength, it is very difficult to calculate victory. Assume, however, there is a sick person and we leave him alone; he will definitely die. But if the doctor’s diagnosis offers a seventy percent chance of survival, provided the patient is operated on, then don’t you think one must try surgery? And if, after the surgery, the patient dies, one must say that was meant to be. This indeed is the situation we face today. . . . If we waste time, let the days pass, and are forced to fight after it it is too late to fight, then we won’t be able to do a thing about it.

Emperor: All right, I understand. [He answered in a better mood.]

Konoe: Shall I make changes in tomorrow’s agenda? How would you like me to go about it? Emperor: There is no need to change anything.

There is no need to change anything. Konoe grabbed Hirohito for a private audience afterwards and tried to get Hirohito to revise the outline, but Hirohito ignored this. Hirohito at that point could have stopped or at least slowed down the countdown to all out war. Hirohito instead did not want to displease the pro-war factions in his military, perhaps he saw them as a threat to his authority. Hirohito was not at all pleased with the policy plan. When he was shown in on september 5th, he looked extremely irritated and blew up on Sugiyama and the army high command as a whole. 20 minutes before the Imperial conference on September 6th, Hirohito spoke with his lord of the privy Kido and told him he was going to raise some questions at the meeting. Kido told him that it would be best to leave the questions at the very end, basically he was advising to allow for things to go through. Thus Hirohito sat through the meeting and sanction the preparations for war. Here is a conversation between Hirohito and the Chiefs of the general staff:

Emperor: You may go ahead and mobilize. But if the Konoe-Roosevelt talks go well, you’ll stop, won’t you?

Chief of the General Staff: Indeed, your majesty, we will.

Emperor: I will ask you one more time: Is there any possibility that the north [that is, the Soviet Union] may move against us while we are engaged in the south [emphasis added]?

Chief of the General Staff: I cannot say that will absolutely not occur. However, because of the season it is inconceivable that large forces will be able to attack us

Meanwhile Konoe’s deadline to reach a diplomatic resolution with the US was fast approaching. On October 13th Hirohito told Kido “In the present situation there seems to be little hope for the Japan–U.S. negotiations. If hostilities erupt this time, I think I may have to issue a declaration of war.” The next day Konoe held his last cabinet meeting and Army minister Tojo took the lionshare of talking:

For the past six months, ever since April, the foreign minister has made painstaking efforts to adjust relations [with the United States.] Although I respect him for that, we remain deadlocked. . . . Our decision was “to start the war . . . if by early October we cannot thoroughly achieve our demands through negotiations.” Today is the fourteenth. . . . We are mobilizing hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Others are being moved from China and Manchuria, and we have requisitioned two million tons of ships, causing difficulties for many people. As I speak ships are en route to their destinations. I would not mind stopping them, and indeed would have to stop them, if there was a way for a diplomatic breakthrough. . . . The heart of the matter is the [imposition on us of] withdrawal [from Indochina and China]. ...If we yield to America’s demands, it will destroy the fruits of the China Incident. Manchukuo will be endangered and our control of Korea undermined

And so Konoe resigned two days later, but before he did his last official action was to recommend Prince Higashikuni to succeed him, in fact he got Tojo to do the same. Prince Higashikuni was deemed capable of controlling both the Army and Navy. And what did Hirohito say to this? He said no, and appointed Hideki Tojo. Why? As going back to the beginning of this series, to protect the Kokutai. He did not want a member of the royal family to hold the seat as Prime Minister during a time when war might be declared, a war that Japan might lose, which would toss the responsibility onto the imperial house. It was a threat to the Kokutai. Hirohito chose Tojo because Tojo was 100% loyal subject to the emperor. Tojo was the perfect fall guy if one ever existed.

Between November 8-15th, Hirohito received a full rundown of the Pearl Harbor surprise attack plan and sanctioned it. The deadline to reach a diplomatic solution with the US was set for midnight December 1st.

Hirohito ever since the Mukden Incident had expressed fear that not taking warlike actions, not pumping up the kokutai or not suppressing dissent would jeopardize the imperial system of government and damage the imperial institution itself. For Hirohito domestic conflicts were more dangerous than external ones, because they carried the risk of eroding the monarchy. As the time approached for his finally decision on declaring war, Hirohito requested a last round of discussion. The carriers enroute to Pearl harbor departed on november 27th, while on December 1st, 19 leaders, the entire Tojo cabinet and Emperor met. Tojo pulled a rather cheeky maneuver, he reported the response from America, the famous Hull note by stating “the United States . . . has demanded that we withdraw troops from all of China [emphasis added],” but in fact, Hull had used only the word “China.” Hara asked “I would like to know,whether Manchukuo is included in the term ‘China’? Did our two ambassadors confirm this point?” Togo’s reply to this was “However . . . the American proposal [early in the negotiations on] April 16 stated that they would recognize the state of Manchukuo, so Manchukuo would not be part of China. . . . On the other hand . . . there has been a change in their position . . . they look upon Chungking as the one and only legitimate regime, and . . . they want to destroy the Nanking regime, [so] they may retract what they have said previously” A nonsensical gibberish answer, intentionally done to make everyone think America did in fact include Manchukuo, thus forcing everyone to see the demands as impossible to comply with. Togo finished the meeting : “Once His Majesty decides to commence hostilities, we will all strive to meet our obligations to him, bring the government and the military ever closer together, resolve that the nation united will go on to victory, make an all-out effort to achieve our war aims, and set his majesty’s mind at ease. I now adjourn the meeting.” Hirohito simply nodded. Sugiyama remarked that the emperor did not show the slightest sign of anxiety, in fact he looked like he was in a good mood.

Hirohito’s naval aid Jo Eiichiro wrote minutes on the first day of the pacific war, recording the emperors actions.

4 A.M. (Japan time): Japan issued a final ultimatum to the United States. 3:30 A.M.: the Hawaiian surprise attack was successful. 5:30 A.M.: Singapore bombed. Great results. Air attacks on Davao, Guam, Wake. 7:10 A.M.: All the above was reported to the emperor. The American gunboat Wake was captured on the Shanghai front. The British gunboat Petrel was sunk. From 7:15 to 7:30 the chief of the Navy General Staff reported on the war situation. At 7:30 the prime minister informally reported to the emperor on the imperial rescript declaring war. (Cabinet meeting from 7 A.M.). At 7:35 the chief of the Army General Staff reported on the war situation. At 10:45 the emperor attended an emergency meeting of the privy council. At 11:00 A.M. the imperial rescript declaring war was promulgated. 11:40 A.M. Hirohito conferred with Kido for about twenty minutes.] At 2:00 P.M. the emperor summoned the army and navy ministers and bestowed an imperial rescript on them. The army minister, representing both services, replied to the emperor. [At 3:05 P.M. the emperor had a second meeting with Kido, lasting for about twenty minutes.] At 4:30 P.M. the chiefs of staff formally reported on the draft of the Tripartite (Germany-Italy-Japan) Military Pact. At 8:30 P.M. the chief of the Navy General Staff reported on the achievements of the Hawaii air attack. . . . Throughout the day the emperor wore his naval uniform and seemed to be in a splendid mood.

Hirohito believed Germany would win, thus if with their help he believed Japan could thwart off the US until a negotiated peace. Having made his choice, Hirohito devoted himself to presiding over and guiding the war to victory at all costs. He was a extremely cautious person, every single campaign he looked for what could go wrong, made worse case scenario predictions and was very suspicious of reports from his high officials. He was notably very harsh and critical on said high commanders. Although he did not visit the war theaters as did other commanders in chief, he exercised and controlled influence on theater operations, both in the planning and execution whenever he chose to do so. As was the same case with the China war before it, he issued the highest military orders of the Imperial HQ, performed audited conferences and led to decisions transmitted in his name. He received generals and admirals to the imperial palace who gave full reports of the battlefront. He visited bases, battleships, various army and naval headquarters. He inspected military schools, you know the full shebang.

After 26 months of war, the naval air force had lost 26,006 aircraft, nearly a third of its total power, thousands of veteran pilots were dead. Hundreds of thousands of tons of warship was sunk, the merchant and transport fleet was crippled. Late 1943 saw the Americans turning the initiative of the war, Japan was on the defensive. Guadalcanal had been the major turning point. During the staled battle for the philippines, Hirohito pressed upon Army chief of staff Sugiyama to increase troop strength to knock out Bataan. The problem persisted, on February 9th and 26th Hirohito pressed Sugiyama again about getting more troops to take Bataan.

Hirohito was confronted with the prisoner of war issue after the doolittle raid. When the pilots were caught, Togo initially opposed executions, but many in the IJA sought all 8 men executed. Hirohito chose to intervene and commuted the execution of 5 out of the 8. Why just 5, no one knows to this day, but its theorized it was to demonstrate his benevolence while simultaneously giving a bit of what the army wanted.

The CBI theater took the lionshare of his attention in 1942, he continuously pressed up Sugiyama when a final blow would be delivered against Chongqing. When the Midway disaster occurred, Hirohito was given a full report of what happened, but he chose to hid the extent of the loss from the IJA. In fact in response to the Guadalcanal campaign he was heard once asking “I wonder if this is not the start of the AmericanBritish counteroffensive?” He urged his commanders to increase offensive activities and to toss all weapons possible at the enemy, because Japan needed more time to secure its reserves of vital oil, rubber and iron. When he heard the first report of the Ichiki detachment being wiped out, he simply stated “I am sure it [Guadalcanal] can be held.” With numerous reports pouring in about the men dying from tropical disease and starvation, Hirohito kept demanding greater efforts from them. Hirohito continuously applied pressure on his naval and land commanders to recapture the island. On September 15th, November 5th and November 11th he called for more IJA troops and aircraft to be allocated to it. Sugiyama was nervous about sending more IJA pilots as they were inexperienced in transoceanic combat and he sought to reinforce the north china army to hit Chongqing. Hirohito demanded it a second time and Sugiyama replied the IJA had deployed its air power instead to New Guinea and Rabaul. Hirohito continuously hammered the issue despite the high level commanders disagreeing with it. By late november it was clear guadalcanal was a lost cause.

At an imperial HQ conference on December 31st of 1942, the chiefs of staff reported they would cancel the attempts to recapture guadalcanal. Hirohito sanctioned it but stated “It is unacceptable to just give up on capturing Guadalcanal. We must launch an offensive elsewhere.” Hirohito forced the issue and it was decided the new strategic points would be in the solomons north of New Georgia and the Stanley range on New Guinea. Hirohito in fact threatened not to authorize the withdrawal of men from Guadalcanal until such a plan was made. Hirohito would go on to oppose the withdrawal from the Munda airfield on New Georgia since it contradicted the new defensive line. As the defensive perimeter in the central and northern solomons was crumbling, Hirohito continued to demand the navy fight decisive battles to regain the initiative so ships could begin transports supplies to the countless soldiers trapped on islands without them. When Hirohito heard of the navy’s failure to reinforce Lae on March 3rd he stated “Then why didn’t you change plans immediately and land at Madan? This is a failure, but it can teach us a good lesson and become a source of future success. Do this for me so I can have peace of mind for awhile.” “Do this for me” would become his signature message.

In August of 1943 as the fall of the solomons progressed, Hirohito lambasted “Isn’t there someplace where we can strike the United States? . . . When and where on earth are you [people] ever going to put up a good fight? And when are you ever going to fight a decisive battle?Well, this time, after suffering all these defeats, why don’t you study how not to let the Americans keep saying ‘We won! We won!’[emphasis added]”” Hirohito berated his chiefs of staff and in the face of mounting defeats he remained undismayed, rigidly self disciplined and aggressive as ever. When he received a report on September 21st of 1943 that the allies were heading for Finschhafen he replied “Being ready to defend isn’t enough. We have to do the attacking.”

When the Americans destroyed the main naval anchorage at Truk forcing the navy to evacuate it, leaving behind numerous tanks, the dream of fighting one great decisive naval battle in the central pacific was over.

On February 21st of 1944, Hirohito took the unprecedented action to force Sugiyama to resign so Tojo could assume his position, alongside that of army minister and prime minister. He did this to end dissent. Hirohito and Tojo oversaw the haymaker attempts in 1944, like operation Ichi-go and the Imphal campaign fall into ruins. It looked like the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, the Bonin islands and eventually the home islands would be invaded. When Saipan fell, the home islands had at last come into range of the dreaded B-29 Super flying fortresses. Hirohito had warned Tojo “If we ever lose Saipan, repeated air attacks on Tokyo will follow. No matter what it takes, we have to hold there.” For two days his chiefs of staff explained the dire situation on Saipan was hopeless, but Hirohito ignored their advice and ordered Admiral Shimada to recapture it, the first department of the navy general staff immediately poured themselves into the problem. Day and night they worked, until a draft plan was created on June 21st, 3 days later the combined fleet gave opposition. Tojo and Shimada formally reported to Hirohito the recapture plan needed to be canceled. Hirohito refused to accept the loss of Saipan and ordered his chief aide General Hasunuma to convene in his presence the board of field marshals and fleet admirals. They all met on the 25th, upon which they all unanimously stated the reports indicating Saipan was a lost cause were valid, Hirohito simply told them to put it in writing and he left the room.

Hirohito finally decided to withdraw his support of Tojo, allowing Tojo’s numerous enemies to take down his cabinet on July 18th 1944. But Hirohito was undaunted in determination to steal victory from the allies. Imperial HQ on October 18th ordered a decisive naval battle and the battle of Leyte Gulf was it. After the war Hirohito would go on the record stating “Contrary to the views of the Army and Navy General Staffs, I agreed to the showdown battle of Leyte thinking that if we attacked at Leyte and America flinched, then we would probably be able to find room to negotiate.” This statement shows the facts as they were, Hirohito and his chiefs of staff forced the field commander, General Tomoyuki Yamashita to engage the American invasion force in a place Yamashita did not want to fight nor prepared adequate defenses. It was a horrible loss.

The Kamikaze attacks increased as Japan’s desperation wore on. On new years day of 1945 Hirohito inspected the special last meal rations given to departing kamikaze units. Iwo Jima fell. Okinawa remained, and Hirohito lashed out “Is it because we failed to sink enemy transports that we’ve let the enemy get ashore? Isn’t there any way to defend Okinawa from the landing enemy forces?” On the second day of Okinawa’s invasion Hirohito ordered a counter landing by the 32nd army and urged the navy to counterattack in every way possible. It was a horrible failure, it cost the lives of up to 120,000 Japanese combatants, 170,000 noncombatants. The Americans lost 12,500 killed and 33,000 wounded. An absolute bloodbath.

Konoe re-entered the stage writing to Hirohito pleading with him to order a surrender because from his perspective “The Soviet Union is Japan’s biggest threat. Defeat was inevitable, but more to be feared than defeat was the destruction of the Kokutai. Sue quickly for peace, before a Communist revolution occurred that would make preservation of the kokutai impossible”. Hirohito was taken aback by this, as he shared his military’s hope that the Soviets would help Japan reach a peace settlement. So he rejected the advice of Konoe. Hirohito remarked “If we hold out long enough in this war, we may be able to win, but what worries me is whether the nation will be able to endure it until then.” Then Japan’s intelligence units reported the Soviets were going to break the neutrality pact and join the war once the Germans were done. Meanwhile Tokyo was turned to rubble on March 9th 1945 by 334 B-29’s dropping firebombs, 40% of the capital was destroyed, up to 100,000 were dead. Hirohito remained undaunted. 60 Japanese cities were leveled by firebomb campaigns. Europe’s war finished. Then the battle for Okinawa was lost, suddenly Hirohito began looking for ways to end the war.

On June 22nd Hirohito personally informed the supreme war leadership council his desire to see diplomatic maneuvers to end the war. A special envoy was sent to Moscow, while Hirohito publicly issued an imperial rescript ordering the nation “to smash the inordinate ambitions of the enemy nations and achieve the goals of the war”. B-29’s began dropping leaflets with joint declarations issued by the US, UK and China requesting the citizens of Japan demand their government surrender. Prefectural governors, police chiefs and officers began submitting home ministry reports on the rapid deterioration of the nations spirit.

Germany signed the unconditional surrender documents on May 7th and 8th of 1945, Japan was alone. Newly installed President Truman declared on May 8th, Japan’s surrender would not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people, but the unconditional surrender principles remained unaltered. The Japanese meanwhile were awaiting word from the Soviets. The Americans unleashed their first atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6th of 1945 killing up to 140,000 people. Then on August 8th the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and began an invasion of Manchuria. On August 9th the second atomic bomb hit Nagasaki killing around 40,000 people.

Thus began the surrender clock as I like to say. After the first atomic bomb, Hirohito said and did nothing about the surrender terms. Hirohito then authorized Togo to notify the world on August 10th that Japan would accept the allied terms of surrender with one condition “that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.” The next day, Secretary of State Byrnes replied by alluding to the subordination of the emperors authority to the supreme commander of the allied powers. It was ambiguous as hell. The Japanese leaders erupted into arguments, and on August 14th, Hirohito went before a microphone and recorded his capitulation announcement which aired on August 15th to all in Japan, they surrendered. Why did it take so long?

The peace talks between the Japanese and Soviets went on through June, July and early August. Japan offered the Soviets limited territorial concessions and they refused to accept the envoy on July 22nd because the Japanese were being too ambiguous in their terms. There was continuous back and forth between the intelligence of Moscow and Japan trying to figure out the stance of the other, but then Stalin heard about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, he was shocked and ordered an invasion of Manchuria in response. In the meantime the Japanese were tossing all sorts of concessions at Moscow, they stated they would allow Japanese to be used as forced laborers in Siberia, a form of reparation as it were, that they would demobilize the military and so on. The response was the invasion of Manchuria.

Hirohito knew prior to the bombing of Hiroshima that the cabinet was divided on accepting the Potsdam terms. Hirohito also knew he and he alone could unify governmental affairs and military command. Why then did he wait until the evening of August 9th to surrender?

The reality of the matter is its complicated, numerous variables at play, but let me try to pick at it. The people of japan under the firebomb campaigns were becoming hostile towards the military, the government and many began to criticize the emperor. Hirohito was given reports from the Home Ministry from governors and police chiefs all over Japan revealing people were speaking of the emperor as an incompetent leader who was responsible for worsening the war situation. Does that sound like a threat to the Kokutai? People were starving en masse, the atomic bomb is flashy, but what really was killing the Japanese, it was starvation. The home islands were blockaded and the sea approaches mined as pertaining to the optimally named “operation starvation”. Hirohito knew full well how bad his people were suffering but he did not surrender for so long.

After Hiroshima was bombed, Hirohito delayed for 2 days before telling Kido at 10am on August 9th “quickly control the situation, the Soviet Union has declared war and today began hostilities against us”. Now here is a piece of Hirohito’s surrender proclamation to the citizens of Japan

“Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers...

The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable

”.

Hirohito wanted to obfuscate the issue of accountability, to prevent expressions of strife and anger and to strengthen domestic unity around himself, to protect and raise the kokutai. Did you know there was a rescript of this proclamation that was made to the entire IJA and IJN? Yes Emperor Hirohito gave out two different proclamations for surrender, here is what the armed forces heard.

“ Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue . . . under the present conditions at home and abroad would only recklessly incur even more damage to ourselves and result in endangering the very foundation of the empire’s existence. Therefore, even though enormous fighting spirit still exists in the Imperial Navy and Army, I am going to make peace with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, as well as with Chungking, in order to maintain our glorious national polity”.

The proclamation does not speak of the atomic weapons, but emphasizes the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. Hirohito was presented as a benevolent sage and an apolitical ruler that had ended the war. Hirohito sought to justify the surrender upon the bombs to the public, but did he believe so, did his armed forces believe so? People debate to this day why the surrender occurred, I love the fact there are two message offered because both are true. Hirohito’s decision to surrender was based on numerous variables, the atomic bombs, the invasion of Manchuria by the soviets, but above all else, what really was important to the man, the emperor, the god? The kokutai. The Soviets were more of a threat to the kokutai, thus Hirohito jumped into the arms of the Americans. The language between the Americans and Japanese in the communications for unconditional surrender were ambiguous, but Hirohito and the high commanders knew there was zero chance of the kokutai surviving if the Soviets invaded Japan, perhaps the Americans would allow it to continue, which is just what they ended up doing. The entire purpose of this series would to emphasize how Hirohito definitely had a active role in the war of 1931-1945, he had numerous occasions where he could put the hammer down to stop the situation from escalating. But in the end when his back was against the wall, he did what he did to cling on to the Kokutai.

I shall leave you with this. On August 12th, as Hirohito came to inform the imperial family of his decision to surrender, Prince Asaka asked him whether the war would continue if the Kokutai could not be preserved, what do you think he said? “Of Course”.

- 210 - Special Failure & Responsibility Emperor Hirohito Part 2

The Pacific War - week by week