Last time we spoke about the allied offensive against Mubo and the naval battle of Kolombangara. The Australians and Americans were continuing the drive towards Salamaua and Lae, but in their way was the once heavily fortified area of Mubo. Because of intricate diversionary attacks in multiple places, the Japanese gradually lifting their defensive positions in Mubo, until the time was ripe for the allies to seize it. The Pimple, Green Hill and Observation hill, places that caused suffering and hardship were finally seized, Mubo was secured. Over in the Solomons, the New Georgia campaign was continuing, forcing the Japanese to make another daring Tokyo Express run like they did at the battle of Kula Gulf. Yet again Admiral Ainsworth went out to face the enemy, completely ignorant of their torpedo capabilities and he paid for it dearly. Today we are going to continue these stories.

This episode is the Drive on Munda Point

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

Today we are starting with the main drive towards Munda. We are picking up from last time where General Wing had finally begun his main advance on Munda on July 9th. Now the landings had occurred on July 2nd, from then on the Americans were busy making another landings such as at Rice Anchorage, getting forces to assembly points and trying to hinder any efforts by the Japanese to reinforce Munda. If you were looking down upon a map it would basically look like multiple forces taking up positions that cut off trails and ports that extend towards Munda. Everyone had a unique task and a time table, but as we all know not everything goes according to plan. When General Wing ordered the main advance, two infantry regiments were greatly delayed, those being the 172nd who moved a grand total of 1100 yards and the 169th who made zero ground at all. The war planners had not considered how difficult it would be for ground forces to travel the single narrow tracks, dense jungles, mangroves, creeks, ridges and ravines. The men found navigation difficult and whenever the terrain seemed to narrow they found Japanese defenses. The 172nd were ordered by Major Genera Hester to carry out flanking maneuvers against a roadblock set up by the 9th company, 3rd battalion, 229th regiment while the 169th attacked them frontally. They were supported by heavy artillery, naval bombardment and aerial bombing. But General Sasaki correctly predicted the American commanders intentions and responded to them rather quickly with his own counter flanking maneuvers. His forward area was held by Japanese snipers, well concealed in baskets in trees whom employed rifles that gave little to no muzzle flashes, something that was turning into a real trait of the Japanese.

The 172nd progressed a few hundreds yards with its 1st battalion leading the way, the 2nd behind them and the 3rd following from a distance. They were assaulting a point where the Munda trail intersected another trail running southwest to a beach and southwest of this were the native villages of Ilangana and Laiana. The Japanese managed to keep them 1500 yards away with this defenses. The Artillery was not working to dislodge the Japanese from their roadblock and during the night the Japanese were reinforced with some units of the 11th company who took up some high ground later called Reincke Ridge. This made things ever worse for the inexperienced and pretty brutally shaken 169th who had the unfortunate job of meeting them in a front assault.

Things were becoming even worse for General Wing. Despite the slow progress, the American forces had actually overstretched their logistics by July 10th. The 118th engineer battalion had been making some good progress building a jeep trail going from Zanana to the Barike River. They relied on information provided by native scouts, and the engineers built the trail over high dry ground, averaging around half a mile or so per day. But the 5 foot deep fast running stream east of the Barike caused a ton of soft mud, not very engineer friendly. To get the ground firm enough for footbridges and such they were forces to swing the road northward parallel to the river for over 2 miles. This gap between the end and front of the road meant near half of the combat troops were forced to carry forward ammunition, food, water and other supplies and let us not forget everyone who gets sick or wounded needed to be carried back on the same roadways. Again, logistics are not as sexy as the combat and don’t usually get much time of day, but its important for any war effort, hell look at Russia today.

To solve his logistical headache, General Hester decided to divert the 172nd infantry regiment south towards Laiana, while the 169th would continue their miserable advance up the Munda trail. Now Laiana was just 500 yards east of the main Japanese defensive line at Ilangana, currently held by the 2nd and 3rd battalion of the 229th regiment and 2nd independent Quick-fire battalion all under the command of Colonel Hirata Genjiro. The 172nd would have the support of the 3rd battalion, 103rd regiment and 8 M3 Stuart tanks of the 9th defense battalion who were expected to land at Laiana by July 13th.

On the morning of the 11th, the 172nd began turning south wading through knee deep mud and having the Japanese fire mortars upon them. By midway they had advanced 450 yards when they came across some Japanese bill boxes. While this was going on the 169th were pushing against the Japanese upon the high ground leading to a stalemate. Because of this Colonel Temple Holland replaced Colonel Eason as commander of the 169th and Colonel Frederick Reincke took command of its 3rd battalion which was being led by Major William Stebbins. On July 12th the Colonel Holland began a plan calling for the 1st battalion to attack frontally while the 2nd battalion enveloped the Japanese left flank. The 3rd battalion who were in reserve were released to engage the enemy, but the entire thing bogged down immediately as units became intermingled with the 172nd who were on their way to Laiana.

Meanwhile Rear Admiral Aaron Merrill with task force 36 was ordered to depart Ironbottom Sounds and provide naval bombardment from the Blanche Channel in coordination with heavy artillery in Rendova and aerial bombing from AirSols. Merrill took 4 light cruisers Columbia, Cleveland, Denver and Montpelier into the narrow channel while his two destroyers Farenholt and Buchanen took up a position near the Munda Bar to shell the Kokenggolo Hill Area. Merrills force fired 8600 shells for 40 minutes, which did clear the jungle in front of the advancing troops, but ultimately did little else as they were forced to fire a mile in front of the American positions, but within that mile were the said Japanese defenses. As you can imagine, the boys on the ground were all too excited to now advance, only to find the same unhampered enemy facing them. The 1st battalion, 169th regiment managed to gain about 300 yards; the 2nd battalion received enfilading fire from a ridge to the north, unable to progress and the 3rd battalion assaulted the southern ridge for several hours enjoying some artillery and aerial support. To the south the 172nd were stuck in front of the pill boxes. These pill boxes were not made out of concrete, but instead coconut logs and coral, pretty ingenious stuff. They ranged from 10-12 feet square, with 3-4 layers of logs banked with 6-8 feet of weathered coral. Their ceilings were usually around 10 feet from the floor, dug into the earth so that 2-4 feet of the pill box projected above the ground. Each had several firing slits for riflemen or machine guns. Outside the pill boxes were foxholes, and trenches connected all positions. All of this was well camouflage using earth, grass, vines, palm fronds and such, leading Americans to stumble onto a pill box without even noticing it. One remark made by the 43rd division after coming across them was that they had an easier time smelling them than seeing them. So if you ever watched classic Pacific War films or the Pacific Series and wondered how some of these pill boxes were made, there you go.

On the morning of the 13th Colonel Holland requested some aerial support and he got some at 10am. 12 Dauntless dropped 1000 pound daisy cutters upon some smoke markers laid out by the 169th. The dive bombers manage to hit the target perfectly before Holland ordered the men to charge. The 2nd battalion went through the center, while the 1st battalion took the right and the 3rd battalion took the left. They hit the north and south ridges trying to envelop the Japanese. E and F companies of the 2nd battalion ran into heavy machine gun fire, causing a halt. The 1st battalion tried to climb the north ridge but were obstructed by a ton of felled trees and craters due to the bombing. The Japanese who survived the bombardments opened fire from their pillboxes keeping the Americans in check. The charging Americans now without artillery or mortar support tried to push forward with rifle and bayonet, seeing many killed upon the crest or wounded. Company B would lose 3 of its 4 officers alone. The 3rd battalion now led by Colonel Reincke fought for some hours managing to progress 500 yards into the Japanese lines securing the south ridge. They fought pillbox through pillbox, it was a terribly bloody affair, resulting in 100 casualties. When they took the ridge they held the position, beating back several counterattacks during the night, to which the men named the ridge Reincke. Soon the 1st and 2nd battalions took up positions on the 3rds flanks securing Reincke ridge, while the Japanese concentrated on the northern ridge and to the west they held a higher ground called Horseshoe hill.

Meanwhile the 172nd had their lines of communication cut off in their rear by the Japanese forcing them to quicken up the pace as they were running low on food. They made it to Laiana beach in the late afternoon successfully securing the beach and organizing defensive positions. The following morning General Hester landed the 3rd battalion, 103rd regiment and the tanks to back them up at Laiana. This came also with some much needed supplies for the worn out men. Having supplied the men to the southern beach, now the men in the northern front required resupply. Reinckes men were tossing back more counterattacks. One morning Japanese artillery fired upon the ridge bursting a tree that killed 4 men and wounded 23. Alongside this 5 men were reported to have a case of shell shock, 7 others war neurosis. Machine gun fire claimed 2 men, wounded another 5. At 8pm artillery began again killing another 8 men and wounding 26. There were no medical officers with the battalion, leaving medics to do what they could. Despite the hardship the 3rd battalion held their ground, and gradually the Japanese evacuated the northern ridge which the 2nd battalion quickly seized.

By July 15th, the 4rd divisions engineers had managed to complete the jeep trail from Laiana to the 169th area. Telephone lines crews began to lay underwater cables between Zanana, Laiana and General Barkers artillery teams. Engineers also finished a bridge over the Barike on the 12th and on the 14th had extended the trail within 500 yards of the 169th front lines. Supply lines were finally being secured, and more importantly the wounded would be able to be safely transported. By July 17th, the 43rd division had 90 deaths, 636 wounded in actions and over 1000 cases of sickness ranging from the ever present friend malaria, but also diarrhea, dysentery and such. As mentioned, cases of psychological problems were also very apparent. Half of the 43rd division were suffering war neurosis, which we call today Combat Stress Reaction “CSR”. This is an acute reaction from the stress of war that causes the combatant to feel fatigued, have slower reactions, be indecisive, and can become disconnected from one's surroundings. It’s classic psychological trauma, kind of similar to what I assume many of you listeners would think of as PTSD, but it is not the same thing, PTSD can see durations lasting months if not even years, while CSR has a short duration. Small tidbit of info since my first degree is in neuroscience, a fairly recent study in the later 2000’s was done to look at the issue of CSR, shellshock and such from a neurological point of view. The idea was to figure out if specific physical damage was being done to parts of the brain during blast trauma that caused combat stress reactions. The reason the study was done was because the symptoms from such maladies often overlap with things you see in traumatic brain injuries, anyways was interesting reading back in my uni days.

As pointed out by historian Samuel Eliot Morison, it seemed General Hester’s choice of sending the 172nd infantry regiment south, had greatly exposed the inexperienced 169th. In his words “This was perhaps the worst blunder in the most unintelligently waged land campaign of the Pacific war (with the possible exception of Okinawa). Laiana should have been chosen as the initial beachhead; if it was now required, the 172nd should have been withdrawn from Zanana and landed at Laiana under naval gunfire and air support. Or Hester might have made the landing with his reserves then waiting at Rendova. As it was, General Sasaki interpreted the move correctly and by nightfall had brought both advances to a standstill.” In order to break the deadlock that was occurring, some of the command structure would be reorganized. This coincided with half of the 4rd division being knocked out of commission, prompting General Hester to request reinforcements for the drive against Munda.

General Harmon performed a inspection of the situation and reported back to Admiral Halsey on Guadalcanal. He advised sending forward General Oscar Griswold of the 14th corps with a forward echelon of staff so he could begin building up the administrative, supply and planning for the future New Georgia occupation force. Once Munda had fallen, this would allow General Hester to carry on against Vila. Harmon justified this by stating Hesters force was too small to do it, but there was another rationale. By doing this it would relegate Admiral Turner to a supporting role, whom the army and marines were resenting because of what they deemed to be his meddling of ground operations. Admiral Turner opposed the idea, and Halsey replied to Harmon he could simply increase Hester’s staff. This prompted Harmon to fly back to COMSOPAC HQ on Noumea to personally talk to Halsey and force the issue.

Griswold showed up at midnight on the 15th assuming command of the occupational force, leaving Hester to focus on the actions of his 43rd divisions offensive. Griswold began his new task by directing Major General Robert Beightler to the rest of the 37th division to New Georgia alongsideColonel Collins 161st regiment of his 25th division. Over at Zanana, the 1st battalion of the 145th regiment arrived at 5pm, which Colonel Holland tossed up to help reinforce the 169th.Now that Admiral Turner was relieved as commander of the South Pacific Amphibious force, his new orders were to take command of the central pacific offensives, replacing Admiral Wilkinson.

Now General Hester was preparing for a corps level offensive, but it would take over 10 days to build up and in the meantime the Japanese began to prepare a major counter offensive. On July 16 and 17 some small attacks were performed against the Ilangana line, supported now by the newly arrived tanks, but a lack of coordination between the 172nd regiments infantry and tanks led to only a bit of gain. Nonetheless the tanks did help against the pillboxes. The tanks took up a wedge formation and used their 37mm guns with high explosive shells to dislodge the panicking Japanese trying to fight back with their machine guns from many of the forward pillboxes. However the Japanese were only phased by the arrival of the tanks for about a day as on July 18th they started to employ anti tank strategies to great effect. The Japanese defenders began tossing a mixture of mines, molotov cocktails and flame-throwers, forcing Griswold to withdraw the remaining tanks and ordered the transportation of the 10th defense battalions tanks to reinforce them.

Meanwhile the 169th regiment were advancing southwest towards Kelley Hill located 400 yards southwest of Reincke Ridge. They faced little opposition, but would soon see wave after wave of Japanese counterattacks to dislodge them. On the other side, the 1st and 3rd battalions of Colonel Tomonari’s 13th regiment had arrived at the scene and managed to bypass Colonel Liversedge’s roadblock. General Sasaki planned to toss Tomonari around the American’s right flank near the east bridge over the Barike river. From there they could advance upon Zanana Beach. By July 14th, the 1th regiment were marching to the upper Barike, but the men lacked maps and were hacking their own trail. Tomonari said of this “If we had to go round and round in circles in the jungle, not having been able to find the enemy, nor having been able to help the 229th Regiment and let them die, it would really hurt the reputation the 13th Infantry Regiment had had for a long time, since the Sino- and Russo-Japan War. That was why most soldiers were feeling the pressure. Finally meeting the enemy at that point was like meeting Buddha in hell.” It would take them days to march through the thick jungle. On the night of July 17th, Tomonari and the men found a jeep trail heading towards General Hesters HQ on Zanana Beach. He ordered his men to attack the area which at this time was being guarded by a platoon of the 4rd reconnaissance troops and 70 Fijian commandos led by Captain David Williams. General Hester was not at the HQ at this time he was at Laiana, but Generals Wing and Barker were. The Japanese launched simultaneous raids against the engineer and medical bivouacs and 43rd divisional command post. At the same time Captain Kojima of the 229th regiment launched an attack against Kelley Hill on the 18th. At 10am Japanese machine guns north of Kelley opened fire as riflement charged the its western slope. The 1st battalion fired upon the charging Japanese as the 3rd battalion fired upon the machine gunners to the north. The Japanese assault was threatening to break the line. Many of the Japanese managed to crawl within grenade tossing distance of the northern line of the 1st battalion, but mortar fire forced them back. It was an extremely bloody attack and the 1st battalion reported finding 102 dead Japanse upon the slopes at daybreak. Another predawn attack was launched by the 2nd battalion 229th infantry against the 3rd battalion, 103rd infantry but they repulsed it. The attacks were done to prevent the American troops there from helping the Zanana defenders. If all went well, Sasaki could destroy the 43rd divisions rear installations cutting off major lines of communications to the surrounding front line forces.

Tomonari’s raids however were chaotic and disorderly. Rather than a organized assault, it fell into a series of separate smaller raids allowing the few reconnaissance and Fijian commandos to fend off the invaders. The reconnaissance forces repelled the attacks upon the engineer and medical bivouacs while the Fijian commandos manned a perimeter alongside Headquarters personnel such as drivers, medical orderlies, clerks, everyone grabbed a rifle despite many not even using one since basic training. The Fijians had better eyesight at night than anyone else and showcased their abilities to the Japanese who were certainly not used to being contested in this field of expertise. Tafa a Tongan, was firing from his foxhole when a Japanese officer wielding a katana and a grenade in the other hand charged at him. Tafa used his Owen gun to mow the man down killing him. The Japanese officer was found later to be carrying documents showcasing the full strength of the Japanese force and details of their mission. The Japanese were screaming as they charged from all directions as the close quarters melee raged on. The Japanese managed to infiltrate the perimeter multiple times, destroying communications equipment, but they could not reach the most important part of the area, General Barkers artillery. Barker unleashed a tight box barrage from extremely close range to devastating effect. The Japanese had no other option than to flee up the jeep trail they came from. Tomonari had his surviving forces erect some road blocks for the next 3 days, but Sasaki’s hopes of knocking out the 43rd divisions HQ were thwarted.

Having survived the major counter offensive, the 148th regiment was quickly landed at Zanana on the 18th and were soon sent over to Reincke Ridge to relieve the poor 169th regiment. Colonel Stuart Baxter of the 148th regiment was surprised by the roadblocks as Griswold never warned him about them. His advance parties were ambushed leading to 2 deaths and some wounded. During the night the Japanese were found drunk off looted whiskey they had taken from a rations dump near the bridge on the Barike. There was a clash where a platoon from the 169th were bringing wounded men down. The drunken Japanese managed to kill many of the wounded men being carried on litters alongside 2 medics. The bridge henceforth was called “Butchers bridge”. The next morning at 8am, Baxter sent his 1st battalion and his HQ up the jeep road to fight the Japanese, but as they went up it seemed the Japanese had withdrawn. Baxters men crossed the east bridge without incident, but as they went further up the road suddenly Japanese machine guns opened up on them. A company lost over a dozen men to this ambush and soon the Japanese were attacking his flanks forcing Baxter to dig in. By July 21st the Japanese would finally depart the area allowing the 148th regiment to relieve the 169th.

As for the 169th, they were sent over to Rendova and General Beightler took command of the 37th division whom he reshuffled for an offensive. A 1300 yard line was formed north of Ilangana with Hester’s 43rd division to the south and Beightler’s 37th division to the north. By this point Hester moved his 43rd divisional command post from Zanana to Laiana where many trails were created to help with the supply lines. Griswold now planned to start an offensive on July 25th, opening up with a naval, artillery and aerial bombardment, before the infantry and tanks performed a frontal assault upon the Japanese line. The 43rd division would hit from the left to take Lambete plantation and its airfield while the 37th division would hit from the right against Bibilo Hill, thus enveloping the Japanese north of the airfield.

Meanwhile, Colonel Currin’s 4th Raiders had secured the Enogai inlet, allowing Liversedge to launch his attack against Bairoko. For the attack on Bairoko, Liversedge planned to use the 1st and 4th Raiders along the ENogai-Bairoko trail to hit the Japanese frontally, while the 3rd battalion, 148th regiment would take the Triri-Bairoko trail to hit their southern flank. Liversedge appeared to have expected aerial bombing support, but did not request or failed to request the air support in time. On the morning of the 20th, the forces began their advance. At 10:00am, Colonel Griffiths 1st Raiders ran into some Japanese outposts manned by just a handful of Japanese. They fired upon them sending them fleeing, as they continued their advance they soon came across a larger force. Eventually they were forced to a halt as they came upon the Japanese main defensive line at around Noon. Commander Okumura Saburo had created 4 successive lines of mutually supporting pillboxes on low parallel ridges running north to south. Meanwhile the 4th raiders advanced within 300 yards short of the shore of Bairoko harbor meeting the Japanese lines of defense.

At 2:30pm, Griffiths D company managed to break into the first line of defense, but an hour later, Okumura ordered heavy mortar fire from the ridges pushing the Americans back and turning the area into a killing field. The 1st raiders were unable to move forward, now resting their hopes on the 4th raiders making a breakthrough in the south. The 4th raiders ran into the Japanese main line during the midday and were not making any progress. Liversedge called the forces at the front and consequently ordered the two raider battalions to take up defensive positions further east on some high ground. The raiders had suffered 200 casualties before they retired to the south shores of Leland Lagoon. The next day, reinforcements came over from Enogai along with air support. At 9:50am 24 Dauntless, 25 Avengers and 8 B-25’s swooped in to bomb Bairoko. This was followed up at noon by 37 Avengers, 6 B-25s, then at 4pm 48 Dauntless and 25 Avengers. 130 tons of bombs his Bairoko alongside an estimated 24,000 rounds of machine gun bullets. Liversedge ordered the men to sit tight and hold their positions for now along a line stretching from Enogai, Triri and Rice Anchorage.

Meanwhile, after the victory during the battle of Kolombangara, Admiral Samejima formed a new Night battle unit, consisting of Heavy cruisers Kumano, Suzuya and Chokai; light cruiser Sendai; and destroyers Yugure, Kiyonami, Yukikaze and Hamakaze, led by Admiral Nishimura. Their unit was given the task of harassing American transportation efforts. Rear Admiral Ijuin Matsuji was now commanding the reinforcement unit who were going to make a run on the 17th, but this was greatly hampered by an American air strike against Buin. On the 17th, 7 B-24s, 32 P-38’s and P-40’s, 37 Dauntless, 36 Avengers and 64 Wildcats and Corsairs hit Buin. 48 Zeros began to take off from Kahili, but they could not scramble fast enough as the Americans bombed the shipping, setting a cargo ship on fire, before the Hatsuyuki took a direct hit to her forward magazine sinking her and 3 other destroyers were damaged. 13 Zeros were shot down while the Americans lost 6 aircraft. Many of Ijuins transports received some minor damage delaying his departure. On July 19th, Nishimura attempted a reinforcement run to New Georgia, but his force was intercepted northwest of Kolombangara by a pack of Avengers. Nishimura’s ships scattered at high speed upon seeing the enemy aircraft, but Yugure was successfully torpedoed and sank as a result. The Kiyonami stuck behind to grab survivors. Meanwhile cruisers Chokai and Kumano were also heavily damaged. The Kiyonami was later attacked by 8 B-25’s who bombed her at masthead level, leaving her dead in the water. The B-25’s also attacked the transports doing some minor damage to the Matsuzuki and Minazuki. 582 men, 102 tons of supplies and 60 drums of fuel were successfully delivered, but the terrible losses led to the newly formed Night Battle unit to be canned.

On the 22nd another reinforcement convoy consisting of Seaplane tender Nishin and destroyers Arashi, Isokaze and Hagikaze made a run to Bougainville led by Rear Admiral Osugi Morkazu. They were carrying 630 men of the South Seas 4th guard unit, 22 tanks and 8 artillery pieces. They were intercepted by a huge force consisting of 12 B-24’s, 16 Dauntless, 18 Avengers, escorted by 134 fighters flown by US army, Marine and New Zealanders. The Nisshin was devastated by bombs, torpedoes and strafing attacks leading her to sink within 14 minutes from the start of the interception. Of her 633 crewmen and 630 troops onboard, only 178 would be rescued later on by destroyers who faced considerable attacks from aircraft doing so. Despite the rather insane levels of allied aircraft attacks, General Imamura continued to commit more forces to the defense of the Central Solomons now assigning the elite 2nd battalion, 230th regiment “Yano Battalion” led by Lt COlonel Yano Keiji to reinforce Vila. They were sent aboard the destroyers Yukikaze, Mikazuki and Hamakaze on the night of the 23rd. Instead of sailing through the slot, they used the Wilson straight which was very fortunate as Admiral Merrill was coming up the slot with a large task force to supply Liversedge at Enogai. At Least the poor Japanese transports dodge one bullet.

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The American drive upon Munda was seeing significant delays as the Japanese proved themselves very capable at defense, especially in pillboxes. However the battles to reinforce New Georgia were costing the Japanese defeats or pyrrhic victories.

- 87 - Pacific War - Drive on Munda point, July 18-25, 1943

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