Last time we spoke about the mop up operations on New Georgia and the continued drive upon Salamaua and Lae. Munda had fallen, New Georgia was certainly a lost cause, but that did not mean there wasn’t come cleaning up to do. The Americans were stuck mopping up places like Arundel and Baanga seeing fierce Japanese resistance. Sasaki ordered his men to fight as hard as they possibly could while others made their way to evacuation points. Over on Green Hell, the Australian and American forces had just taken Mubo and Lababia ridge, prompting General Nakano to create a last line of defense in front of Salamaua. Now the allies had to cross the francisco river and face multiple hills, ridges and knolls. Forward units forded the francisco river and grabbed a few knolls catching a glimpse finally of Salamaua, but a glimpse was all they were going to get as the Japanese fought tooth and nail to push them back.

This episode is Operation Postern

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

The time has come at last. For months, we have seen the Australian and American forces fight for each hill, ridge and knoll, cross over ravines, rivers, swamps, a green hell of a landscape filled with more horror than just the Japanese. From the Jungles of Way to the rugged mountains of bobdubi and Komiatum, through the endless rain, mud and death. Operation Postern was to finally be unleashed, landings at Lae and Nadzab would commence.

Now back in August, Admiral Barbey and General Wooten were forced to postpone D-day for September 4. For Lae the plan called for two battalions of Brigadir Victor Windeyer’s 20th brigade to land on Red Beach; the 2/15th battalion would hit the eastern flank and the 2/17th to western flank closer to Lae. The 2/13th would hit Yellow beach; the 2/23rd battalion with a company of engineers, a field ambulance, a force of artillery and light anti-aircraft section would join the landing phase; the 26th brigade would follow up the initial landings and move right through the beachhead. The planners were concerned with possible Japanese naval action against their beachheads at night, as this had occurred at Guadalcanal and Milne Bay, so the defense of Red Beach would be coordinated with the 2/2nd machine gun battalion.

Red Beach was selected as it was close to Lae, just a bit due east, but out of range of her large gun batteries. Yellow beach was further east and selected as an additional landing area to protect the eastern flank of the main beachhead that would be at red beach. The allies could not provide continuous air cover thus Brigadier Victor Windeyer’s 20th brigade would have to land and unload quick as all hell. The initial plans called for a time of landing known as “h hour” to be between 3am and 4am in line with Wooten’s request that it occur two hours during moonlight before dawn. They estimated they would need 9-10 hours for the unloading phase, the LST’s would then retract at around 1pm. However, when the landing date was postponed for September 4th, this changed everything. Now there would be no morning moon, thus H hour could not be scheduled until after sunrise to allow time for the allied navy to identify the correct beach on a coast that was covered by a low-lying swampy jungle terrain, there was no prominent landmarks it would be difficult. This delayed the landing until 6:30am, resulting in the loss of around 3 hours of unloading time. Alongside that came the decision to retract the LST’s by 11am as the allied air cover could not be guaranteed after 11am. This the unloading time was now reduced to 4.5 hours, that a hell of a lot less than they needed. It was also expected that the troops would take at least 1 to 1.5 hours to disembark leaving just 3 hours to unload supplies. Again logistics are not sexy, but this is the kind of problems needed to be overcome to win wars.

So Brigadier David Whitehead’s 26th brigade was going to follow up the initial landings, moving straight through the beachhead with the 2/2nd machine gun battalion who were earmarked to guard red beach. Furthermore General Heavy’s brigade would dispatch some amphibian scouts with the 532nd engineer boat and shore regiment to go in on the first wave to establish red and yellow markers for the two beaches. To make things even more confusing, there was this enormous fringing reef along the thousand mile coastline with a few breaks. One break in the reef line near a village called Tauali was going to be marked Green beach as a back up landing area. The one and half mile of good narrow beach was to be Yellow beach 1, and yes there was a yellow beach 2, closer to Silimati.

Admiral Barbey was going to employ every vessel he had; 4 Destroyer transports, the Gilmer, Humphreys, Brooks and Sands; 20 LCI’s, 18 LCT’s and 13 LSTs. From August 20-22nd Barbey had a full-scale landing rehearsal carried out at beaches on the south coast of Normanby island. The men learnt a few things from this experience. The first was that the surfacing of tracks with steel mesh was too slow to allow the vehicles to clear the beach. They decided that more stores would be loaded as bulk cargo and more labor would be provided to clear the landing crafts. Thus on August 29th, the 2/13th battalion was taken to Normanby island on destroyer transports were the men were disembarking from the LCVP’s up to their necks in water. There were major differences as you can imagine for the conditions in Australia vs New Guinea. As Patrick Bourke remarked ‘the country fringing the beach was the worst we had been in. Almost impenetrable jungle grew in waist deep swamps, crisscrossed by much deeper creeks.’

There was also a pre-emptive naval bombardment of Finschhafen as reports began to come in indicating enemy troops and supplies were being moved down the coast from Finschhafen by night. Vice Admiral Carpender ordered Captain Jesse Carter, commander of destroyer squadron 5 to sweep the Huan Gulf by night and hit Finschhafen. One of Carpenders staff noted ‘It will be worthwhile to prove the Navy is willing to pitch in, even if we get nothing but coconuts,”. On August 22nd, destroyers Perkins, Smith, Conyngham and Mahan departed Milne bay enroute for the Huon Gulf. This was the furthest allied vessels larger than PT boats had ventured along the New Guinea coast since the beginning of the pacific war. Early on August 22rd, they opened fire on Finschhafen, firing 540 rounds of 5 inch shells within 10 minutes before hauling ass out of there. It was the first naval bombardment of Japanese forces in New Guinea. As for the battle for the skies, General Kenney was preparing to launch a series of air raids against Lae to support Operation postern. On the day before the landing, 21 allies bombers would hit Lae Airfield to try and knock out their aerial capabilities.

Now all of that was just for the Lae landing, we got an entire other operation to hit Nadzab, designated as Z-day which because of the postponement was changed to September 5th. 96 C-47’s, 82 carrying the regiments, 5 carrying artillery and 9 for supplies would be employed by Colonel Paul Prentiss’s 54th troop carrier wing to transport Colonel Kenneth Kinsler’s 503rd parachute regiment. Alongside this, Brigadier Eather’s 25th brigade were earmarked to be the first flown in after the initial landings. On August 31st tossed 3 battalion commanders, their operations and communications officers with supplies using a Flying fortress at a very low altitude over the drop zone. They were acting as a sort of reconnaissance and they would uncover vital information to ensure safe location markers for accurate future drops. Hell they even performed meteorological analysis to figure out the wind conditions for jump areas. Meanwhile they keep saying everyday here in montreal its gonna be sunny and its rained for 5 days straight.

There would be rehearsals for the parachuting forces before September 3rd when the final plan was issued. Kinsler’s 1st battalion led by Major John Britten would hit field B with the task of securing the Nadzab airfield site before establishing a defensive perimeter and beginning work on the airfield. Meanwhile the Australian 2/2nd pioneer battalion led by Lt Colonel J.T Lang would cross the Markham to help construct a new airfield. Alongside this Kinsler’s 2nd battalion led by Lt Colonel George Jones was going to hit field A to capture the Gabsonkek area which would prevent the Japanese from advancing from the north or northwest. Kinsler’s 3rd battalion led by Lt COlonel John Tolson would hit field c to capture Gabmatzung and prevent the Japanese from advancing from the east. Furthermore Prentiss would drop 22 dummy paratroopers in the forests south of Yalu right where Japanese forces occupying Heath’s plantation would be able to see them. It was hoped this deception would delay advances towards Nadzab. By the way I took the time to educate myself a bit more on what is known as Paradummy’s, because honestly until writing this episode I had no idea it was a thing. These were burlap cases filled with straw and plant waste, they kind of look like sackboy to be honest. As you can imagine from ground level looking fairly high up they do look like real paratroopers and they often were dropped alongside real paratroopers to give them a fighting chance against enemy bullets. The more you know.

After all the planning was done Barbey’s little armada departed Milne Bay on the morning of September 3rd. Their journey was uneventful as they disembarked at Buna for a short break before re-embarking in the afternoon. After this point Heavy’s Morobe base was hit by 9 Rabaul based Betty’s with 27 Zeros for escort which tried to high altitude bomb them, doing little damage. Because of the deceptive campaign against Salamaua, termed the Salamaua magnet, very few IJA forces were left guarding Lae. At Lae were Companies 10 and 11 of the 115th regiment to the right bank of the Markham; Company 6 of the 238th regiment at Markham point; the 2 machine gun company of the 238th regiment were spread between the Bunga river and Bulu River; the 15th independent engineer regiment, 2nd company of the 5th battalion of heavy field artillery, the 25th, 29th and 30th machine cannon companies would all be at Lae proper. Aside from the few IJA troops, Rear Admiral Fujita Ruitaro had the 7th base force, formed around the 5th Yokosuka and 5th Sasebo SNLF and the 82nd naval garrisons anti-aircraft and coastal defense units.

The Japanese were having a hell of a difficult time supplying their forces at Lae. To supply the near 10,000 or so men present within the Lae-Salamaua area each month required, 150 barges carrying 1500 cubic meters of supplies. Only large type barges could manage to get through the Dampier straits rather rough sea, smaller barges were too dangerous for the task. After each passing month, the naval ships used for transports were decreasing and by May the supplies were being carried by 6 submarines, cutting the volume in half the following month. After that supplies began to be carried overland from Wewak and Madang and a new barge route was established through Sio and Finschhafen. Regardless the Japanese were barely able to keep Lae and Salamaua supplied. This saw barely 300 fit men left to guard Lae with 2650 troops, malnourished, sick, wounded or suffering tropical ailments. The Japanese did have some big guns however, 28 75mm, 4 105mm and two 155mm for the coastal defenses, but their ammunition supply was quite limited. The 155mm’s only had 30 shells a piece, while the 105mm had 50.

By late July, General Adachi decided to place Major General Shoge Ryoichi in command of the defenses at Lae, talk about a shitty promotion haha. Ryoichi’s rd battalion, 238th regiment was sent first to Salamaua, then Company 6th and the 2nd machine gun company of the 238th regiment managed to reach Lae, but by the time things cooked up the rest would be stuck in Finschhafen. Therefore Rear Admiral Mori Kunizo was sent to grab command of the 7th base force in the meantime while Fujita would lead all the IJN and IJA units currently at Lae. By nightfall on September 3rd, the final voyage began. The allied vessels got to the assembly area unhindered and undetected and by 5:50am on the 4th identified the beach markers. The destroyer transports lowered the landing craft carrying the first wave while performing a 6 minute bombardment. The first landing craft hit the beach at 6:30am and at his guard post at the Japanese anti-aircraft positions overlooking the Lae airfield, private Wada Kiichi heard the sound and saw the flashes of a naval bombardment out in the Guon Gulf. He wrote this ‘Suddenly, there was a booming sound from the sea, and in a split second, I sighted red and yellow tracers come flying on a half moon ballistic arc. Where would the huge fleet land?‘Aren’t they, in fact, landing right here in Lae? ‘If I must die, I will fight with courage and die like an imperial navy man without shame.’

Brigadier Windeyer’s troops began to land at Red and Yellow beach, only meeting 30 members of the 2nd machine gun company of the 238th regiment who they brushed off around the Bulu plantation. General Kenney unleashed air raids against the Japanese airbases. At 7:45am 13 RAAF bombers, 10 Beauforts and 3 A-20 Bostons hit Gasmata; at 9am 24 Liberators hit Lae; at 9:30am 9 Mitchells hit Tuluvu on Cape Gloucester and 3 Bostons returned to hit Gasmata again in the afternoon. As the 22nd squadron War diary noted of the Gasmata raid “the strip is considered unserviceable”. The second wave approached the beach in the larger LCI’s, managing to unload 6 companies without any opposition other than some very annoying reefs near the shore. Thus two waves hit the ground uncontested, but danger did lurk in the skies above. 6 Ki-43 Osca’rs and 3 Ki-51 Sonia’s took off from Lae at 7am and 4 minutes later the Oscars began strafing 7 LCI’s carrying the 2/23rd battalion and its division HQ while the Sonia’s bombed two LCI’s. One of the bombs crashed through the main deck of LCI 339 just forward of its pilot house setting the ship on fire before it began listing to port taking on water. The LCI ran ashore and was abandoned by the crew, 10 of which were wounded. Another bomb narrowly missed LCI 341 exploding near the bottom of the vessel, blowing a large hole amidships on her port side flooding two compartments. The list to port was corrected and the LCI managed to run ashore and would be salvaged later. 9 men were killed with 45 wounded during the attack. 8 Boomerangs and 2 Wirraways came over from Tsili Tsili to aid the next echelons as they began to unload units. The LSTs began clearing the landing area by 11am. The LCT’s took a lot longer to unload than expected, they had arrived at 8am but only cleared the area over the course of 6 hours.

Meanwhile, General Imamura frantically launched a strong air raid towards Law consisting of 12 Betty’s, 8 Val’s and 61 Zero’s. The 81 aircraft strong party departed Rabaul, but was soon discovered by destroyer USS Reid lingering off Cape Cretin at around 1pm. Reid’s report gave enough time for the allies to toss a counter air wave to intercept them consisting of 40 Lightnings and 20 Thunderbolts. A few vals tried to bomb Reid in the meantime, resulting in all misses. The interception saw the loss of 23 Japanese aircraft, mostly Zero’s while only two lightnings were shutdown. However many Japanese aircraft continued towards Morobe where they descended upon the 6th echelons LSTs just off Cape Ward Hunt at around 2pm. These were carrying the Australian 2/4th independent company and the 2/2nd machine gun battalion, just 33 kms east of Morobe heading for Lae. 6 Vals managed to land two bomb hits on LST-473 and the Betty’s one torpedo hit against LST-471. This killed 51, wounded 67 mostly from the 2/4th independent company. The Japanese lost an additional 4 Zeros and 3 betty’s while 15 other aircraft were badly damaged. The remaining LSTs continued on towards Red beach, while some were ordered to divert course to assist the damaged LST’s from the aerial attacks. Destroyer Humphrey’s would grab the wounded and bring them back to Buna. Everything arrived on schedule by 23:00. Thus Admiral Barbey had managed to land 7800 personnel, of which 3780 were combat troops, alongside 3300 tons of supplies.

After the landings, engineers at Red and Yellow beach got to work constructing roads while Windeyer’s combat troops began to extend their perimeter. By nightfall the 2/17th battalion had crossed the Buso river and by 7:30am the 2/7th field company had built a single-girder bridge across it. To defend against further aerial raids upon the beachheads, a battery of the 2/4th light anti-aircraft regiment landed two detachments at Red and yellow beach. By mid afternoon the 2/13th had extended the yellow beach perimeter around 3000 meters inland and 2000 meters east to west. Lt Colonel Colvin’s 2 companies of the 2/13th advanced inland towards the Bulu plantation sending the 30 Japanese who tried to contest them earlier further north towards some hills. Aside from them there were no signs of other enemy, by 2pm patrols of the 2/13th and 2/15th were forded the Suez river between Bulu river and Red beach. Colonel Grace’s 2/15th battalion were given the task of protected the beachhead, while Lt Colonel Simpson’s 2/17th began to advance towards the Buso river at 9am. Two companies of Major broadbent advanced northwest across the Buso going another 4 miles finding no enemy. Two companies of the 2/13th would also advance east along a track going towards Hopoi where opposition was expected. General Wootten wanted to speed up the advance towards Lae to prevent the Japanese from any time to organize a defense east of the Busu river. Wootten gave Brigadier Whiteheads 2/17th battalion the task of passing through the 20th brigade and continued the advance towards Buso river. Over on the other side Admiral Fujita began deploying his forces in a defensive perimeter between the Markham and Busu Rivers, with most of his naval units taking up positions on the right bank of the Busu while Companies 10 and 11 of the 115th regiment, around 127 men were sent to hold Singaua point. General Shoge rushed over as quickly as he could to take command at Lae, while General Nakano sent Major Mukai Masatake to assume command of the frontline actions.

The next day the Australian advance going east and west continued still with no opposition. Simpson’s men went west, advancing through some horrible wet and boggy terrain. To simpsons north was Broadbents men who got lost for a little while fording rivers until they made it to the Singaua plantation. Meanwhile the 2/23rd and 2/24th battalions followed behind them led by Lt Colonel Gillespie and Major McRae. They bivoucked south of Apo where Whitehead placed his HQ. During the morning hours, Brigadier Bernard Evan’s 24th brigade embarked on 20 LCI’s over at Buna and began to land at Red Beach by nightfall. As the Lae operation was moving along full swing, it was now time for Z-day.

A B-24 liberator crashed on take-off after clipping a branch and rammed into 5 troop trucks full of soldiers waiting to debark. Its 4 500 lb bombs exploded tossing 2800 gallons of fuel in all directions killing 59 and wounding 92. It was a horrible disaster and a bad omen. The armada of C-47’s were being escorted by 48 Lightnings, 12 Airacobras and 48 Thunderbolts a very intimidating force. Generals Kenney, Vasey and MacArthur accompanied the armada aboard some flying fortresses. Kenney said to MacArthur “They’re my kids and I want to see them do their stuff”, apparently MacArthur hesitated for a moment before replying “you’re right George We’ll both go. They’re my kids too”. Kenney worried about the consequences of both of them being killed by “some five dollar a month Jap aviator”. MacArthur only worried about becoming airsick and throwing up in front of his colleagues. General Vasey who had witnessed German paratroops in action over Crete back in 1941, watched the drop from above and would write to his wife “I wanted to see paratroops land from the top rather than the bottom as in Crete”. Over 302 aircraft crossed the Owen Stanley range. Heading the armada at 1000 feet were B-25 strafers carrying 8 .50 caliber gun in their noses and 60 frag bombs in their bomb bays. Behind that at about 500 feet were A-20’s ready to lay smoke as frag bombs exploded. At around 2000 feet behind them were 96 C-47’s carrying the paratroops, supplies and artillery. To all their sides were the fights sitting at around 7000 feet. Following this were B-17’s loaded up with 300 lb parachute bombs to be drop ordered by paratroopers. Then even further behind that were B-24’s and more B-17’s who were going to hit Japanese defensive positions at Heath’s plantation and other points between Nadzab and Lae.

Air attacks against the defenses would be followed up with smokescreens. At 10:22am the C-47’s began to drop their paratroopers over their target zones. Each C-47 dropped its men in less than 10 seconds and the whole regiment was unloaded in 4 and a half minutes. The whole of the Nadzab area was landed upon and taken uncontested. Watching it unfold Kenney was impressed going on the record to say “the operation really was a magnificent spectacle. I truly don’t believe that another air force in the world could have put this over as perfectly as the 5th Air Force did.” By 2pm, the 2/2nd Pioneer battalion crossed Markham arriving at Nadzab during the night. The 2/2nd Pioneer battalion began hacking and burning kunai grass off the airstrip to clear it up before successfully extending it from 1500 feet to 3300 feet. This would allow the 871st airborne engineer battalion to land so they could construct two additional airstrips. On September 7th, Vasey’s 7th division began to land at Nadzab, only facing some challenging weather.

C Company of the 24th battalion led by Captain Arthur Duell departed Deep creek on the 4th to attack Markham point acting as a diversion. Lt Fred Child’s 14th platoon performed the initial attack from the southwest followed up by Lt Maurie Yong’s 13th platoon who advanced down a ridge near the river. Two other platoons covered them as they all blasted mortars over the Japanese camp and unleashed 2 vickers guns on Labu island. 100 men of the 6th company, 238th regiment were taken by surprise. They had dug in behind some barbed wire for several months astride a razorback ridge along the Markham river. Their surprise wore off quickly as they unleashed heavy fire killing 12 men and wounding 6. The allies were forced to pull back after killing 18 Japanese. Further to the south, General Nakano was facing some pressure from General Milford’s 5th division. During late August the Japanese had been fighting tooth and nail to hold their last defensive line in front of Salamaua. The Japanese forward positions had been hit by heavy artillery for a long time, but their defenders were hunkering down. Brigadier Monaghan elected to send a company to cross the western slopes of Charlie Hill and occupy a position on its northern portion, thus isolating the Japanese. This was the same strategy that had been employed against Mount Tambu. However Milford instead elected to toss a frontal assault, believing his artillery support would win the day.

Zero hour for the assault was to be 3:20pm, from 11:30am until then artillery smashed the Japanese positions with 2000 shells, 450 mortar bombs and 6000 rounds of machine gun fire. When zero hour hit, D company of the 42nd battalion began their climb. Lt Garland’s 17th platoon led the way, immediately receiving enemy first after the first 100 yards. Two other platoons crossed around to the left and right only getting a few yards further. The approach to Charlie Hill from the west was a very steep thickly clad razorback. Garland’s men had not even seen the enemy and 5 of them were hit. Two hours after the attack had begun, platoon leaders signaled down the slope that no progress could be made, it was simply too steep. Up above there were 4 well camouflaged machine gun nests unleashing havoc. The assault was canceled and the men withdrew.

Over to the west, the 47th battalion launched two attacks against the Kunai spur. Captain Aubrey McWatter’s A company began their attack at dusk on august 28th. Sergeant George Pitt’s 9th platoon took the left as Barnett’s 7th platoon to the right. The assault fell into hand to hand combat quickly, Barnett was twice wounded and his men were forced back. Pitt’s platoon ran into heavy machine gun fire from a well dug in log bunker and were forced back having two deaths and two wounded. On the 30th, Major Idris Leach’s C company made their attack but were forced back by heavy fire. Major Idris Leach and Sergeant Bill Eisenmenger lost their lives in that attack. On that same day, there was a request to increase artillery fire. 200 shells were lobbed upon the enemy the next day, then on september 1st after 5 hours of shelling, two platoons attacked again. They were supported by vickers guns as men scrambled to climb the ridge to its crest. The artillery softened up the enemy somewhat. Platoon leader Lt Ernest Anzac Walters died leading his men in the bloody carnage. They achieved the objective by the late afternoon sending many Japanese fleeing from their positions. Owen guns and grenades broke them. Around 60 dead Japanese were found on the Kunai spur, around 40 of them had been killed by artillery fire, some pillboxes took direct hits. The Kunai Spur was renamed Lewis Knoll after Captain Eric Lewis of B Company.

To the east, after seizing Lokanu ridge, Milford ordered Lt Colonel Jack Amies 15th battalion to head right of the Americans and penetrate the Japanese defensive line at all cost without delay. At first light on the 31st, Lt Doug Matthew’s 18th platoon of D company, reached a junction between Lokanu ridge and a razorback. The Japanese hit Matthew’s men with mortar and machine gun fire. Despite the heavy fire, Matthew and his men crept up 75 yards, but at 12:50pm were met with a shower of grenades from enemies on a crest above them. Matthew decided to wait for reinforcements and artillery support before attacking up Scout ridge. Lt George Matthew’s, brother Lt doug Matthews arrived with the 14th platoon after 1pm and organized a company attack, despite still not having artillery support nor mortars. Lt Doug led the 18th platoon forward, leading to 11 men becoming wounded, Doug likewise received a shot to the leg. George helped his brother get down the ridge and Doug told him before being carried off for care “About six weeks, I think”. George would later recall “I didn’t worry too much about it. I thought on of the family has got out of it”. Lt Doug Matthew died the next day.

The 15th battalion forces kept up the pressure sending C company, but they were repulsed likewise. On September 1st, Colonel Davidson sent B company around the west side of Charlie Hill intending to cut off the Japanese supply lines. Captain Frank Greer’s B Company crossed a creek during the night and advanced 300 meters from the crest of Charlie Hill. They set up an ambush position, unknowingly 30 yards below the enemy perimeter on Charlie Hill. The Japanese tossed multiple counterattacks while A Company managed to establish their own ambush position nearby in some thick undergrowth on the eastern side of Charlie Hill. On September 4th, A Company joined up with B Company to the west, completely sealing off the enemy position.

Meanwhile Captain Yates C company was advancing northwards from Lewis Knoll. Their patrols ran into Japanese losing many men in the process. At 7:15am the next morning they came across a razorback running towards a strongly held enemy position on Twin Smiths. Captain Yates led an attack upon the Twin Smiths, but the enemy fire was too much, forcing him to withdrew.

After the defeat at Arnold’s Crest, Brigadier Hammer had resorted to harassing actions against the enemy. The 2/7th were hitting Arnold’s Crest while Major Warfe’s 58/59th and 2/3rd independent company were hitting rough hill. Hammer sent Lt Garland’s men from C Platoon to infiltrate the Japanese rear and to carry out a diversionary ambush. On September 3rd, Lt Garland ordered Arnold’s Crest to be shelled, so that the noise would cover his men as they began their infiltration. They departed at 9am, moving along the Buiris Creek between the Japanese positions. They ambushed a supply track at 11am, just when the shelling stopped. Garland recalled ‘My men made their way forward through the jungle canopy like deadly green ghosts. I never heard a sound as they moved forward and adopted their ambush positions.’ Garland positioned his men on the southern side of the track with around ten meters between them, covering more than a thousand meters of track, watching while hiding; a difficult balance. Garland noted ‘You soon learn to look through the jungle, by slightly moving your head from side to side, whilst preserving your concealment.’ After two hours of waiting, Garland’s men killed 8 Japanese in an ambush, after this they pulled out.

Finally, Scout Ridge was devastated with artillery and mortar bombardment, allowing Lt George Matthews men to gain its crest where his brother had died. On September 3rd, detachments of the 5th Sasebo and 2nd Maizuru SNLF marines counterattacked and forced the australians off. While this was occurring, Lt Tom Cavenagh’s A company of the 15th battalion seized the unoccupied Lokanu knoll. They crept up the knoll under artillery support to find freshly dug trenches, weapon-pits and foxholes all recently abandoned. By nightfall the SNLF marines attempted to reoccupy the positions but were forced to dig in on the northern side of Lokanu Knoll. On the night of september 4th, General Adachi learnt of the Lae landings and immediately ordered General Nakano to withdrew from Salamaua and to assemble at Lae by september 20th. Japanese forces were going to withdrew towards Kaiapit or Sio through Salawaket. Adachi sent the main body of the 20th division to defend Finschhafen, resulting in the suspension of the construction of the Madang-Lae road. The Nakai detachment of Major General Nakai Masutaro currently at Bogadjim was ordered to defend Kaiapit and hold back the allied advance to help Nakano’s withdrawal.

Nakano ordered the 5th Sasebo and 2nd Maizuru SNLF to cover the movement by barge of the 3rd battalion 102nd regiment towards Law, departing on september 6th. Meanwhile the 51st division prepared a fighting withdrawal and at Lae, General Shoge and Major Mukai just arrived to grab command of the IJA forces. Shoge’s attitude was considered to be the ideal representative of a commander. He often went a day or two without opening his mouth, he was a fighting man who did not display signs of joy or sorrow, nor pleasure or pain. Holding the enemy back to the east and west, even within close range, he remained cool. He never lost his composure and he was a large influence upon his officers and men. Shoge concentrated the whole strength of the Lae garrison to block the superior allied forces while Mukai personally led platoons and companies to direct the fighting at the frontlines.

Meanwhile on september 6th, Wootten’s men continued their advance. The 2/13th battalion reached the Buhem river and captured the overgrown Hopoi airfield. The 2/23rd battalion moved past the 2/17th arriving to the left bank of the Buiem river. From there they pushed back some Japanese to the Singaua plantation. By the late afternoon the Japanese were being hit from the east and north, forcing them to retreat. Ever since D-day, the Japanese had been tossing air raids against Red Beach, the Aluki track and the amphibian craft plying between the beaches, but they were unable to hinder the movement of men and supplies. At midnight on the 6th, 5 LCV’s and 3 LCMS landed supplies from Red Beach to Apo village alleviating the severe ration and ammunition shortage for the forward troops and shortening supply lines. New plans were formed. On September 7th, the 24th brigade would takeover the costal advance while Whiteheads 26th brigade would advance further inland up the Burep River. The climax for the Lae-Salamaua campaign was nearly at hand.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Operation Postern finally kicked off and the amphibious invasion seems to be a resounding success. The Japanese were completely bamboozled and now frantically tried to get men in the Salamaua area over to defend Lae, but would they lose both as a result of it?

- 94 - Pacific War - Operation Postern, September 5-12, 1943

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