Audio note: this article contains 41 uses of latex notation, so the narration may be difficult to follow. There's a link to the original text in the episode description.

Abstract

We present a formal model demonstrating how utilitarian reasoning creates a structural vulnerability that allows AI corporations to acquire a public veneer of safety at arbitrary low cost.

Drawing from the work from Houy [2014], we prove that an organisation can acquire <span>_k_</span> safety minded employees for a vanishingly small premium <span>_epsilon_</span>.

This results formalises a well known phenomenon in AI safety, wherein researchers concerned about existential risks from AI joins an accelerationist corporation under the rationale of "changing things from the inside", without ever producing measurable safety improvements.

We discuss implications for AI governance, organisational credibility, and the limitations of utilitarian decision-making in competitive labour markets.

1) Introduction

The title is a play on It will [...]

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Outline:

(00:22) Abstract

(01:13) 1) Introduction

(02:06) 2) Formal Framework

(04:42) 3) Implications

(06:22) 4) Future Work

(08:10) Conclusion

The original text contained 2 footnotes which were omitted from this narration.

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First published:
October 15th, 2025

Source:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/MFg7nvR2QGd6KkLJZ/it-will-cost-you-nothing-to-bribe-a-utilitarian

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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.

“It will cost you nothing to ‘bribe’ a Utilitarian” by Gabriel Alfour

LessWrong (30+ Karma)