Last time we spoke about Yamato’s Last Stand. In the spring of 1945, as WW2 intensified, the US Marines commenced a fierce assault on Okinawa. Amidst heavy bombardment, the Japanese 32nd Army fortified their positions, preparing for a desperate counteroffensive. Codenamed Operation Ten-Ichi-Go, Japan's final bid involved the legendary battleship Yamato, tasked with a suicidal mission to confront the American fleet. On April 7, 1945, as the Yamato sailed towards its fate, American forces were ready. Hundreds of aircraft descended upon the ship in a coordinated attack, unleashing bombs and torpedoes. Despite its infamous firepower, Yamato struggled against the relentless onslaught. With its systems failing, Captain Aruga and Admiral Ito made the agonizing decision to go down with their ship. As the proud battleship sank, it symbolized both Japan's indomitable spirit and the crushing weight of defeat, forever etching its story into the annals of military history.

This episode is the First Okinawa Counteroffensive

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

Picking up from last time. The Japanese naval-air counteroffensive against Admiral Spruance’s forces at Okinawa had been decisively defeated with minimal losses, allowing General Buckner’s 10th Army to proceed with the land offensive largely without interference. While General Geiger’s Marines advanced toward the sparse Japanese defenses in northern Okinawa, General Hodge’s 24th Corps in the south encountered the main enemy line of resistance centered around the Shuri fortified zone. Initially, the 32nd Army had declined to launch a land counteroffensive in conjunction with Operation Ten-Go and the Yamato’s suicide attack, fearing that the Americans might execute another amphibious landing at Machinato while the Japanese wasted their strength in a futile effort to reclaim the airfields. However, pressure from Tokyo and Formosa compelled General Ushijima to resume planning for this operation. Ultimately, it was decided that instead of initiating a broad counterattack, the Japanese would deploy a brigade-strength force overnight on April 12 to breach the American lines and advance approximately six miles. If successful, this would be followed by a general attack. Accordingly, Colonel Yoshida Masaru’s 22nd Regiment was assigned to the 62nd Division and assembled northeast of Shuri, tasked with attacking through enemy lines east of the Ginowan Road and advancing toward Shimabuku. To bolster this offensive, General Fujioka was also instructed to deploy three reserve battalions for a three-pronged attack from the west aimed at Chatan. However, Colonel Yahara, 32nd Army operations chief, strongly opposed the counterattack plan, feeling that it was not in keeping with the army's defensive mission and that it would waste men. He succeeded in getting the 1st Battalion of the 22d Regiment and elements of the 23d IIB cut from the counterattack force. He made a dire prediction that the infiltrating units, unfamiliar with the terrain in their attack sectors, would get lost, confused, and cut to pieces during a night assault. Taking a sidenote here, I read Yahara’s rather famous novel about his experience of the battle for Okinawa and I highly recommend it to all of you. It's a great insight into the perspective of the Japanese and how the leadership were beginning to change their mind on how to go about the war. Yahara, acting without Ushijima's knowledge, advised Fujioka to commit only four battalions to the attack, predicting it would inevitably fail.

Meanwhile, the American offensive was still in progress. On April 9, as Major-General George Griner’s 27th Division landed at the Orange Beaches near Kadena, the ships of Colonel Waltern Winn’s 105th Regiment met with Admiral Blandy’s Eastern Islands Attack and Fire Support Group at the Kerama Islands, preparing to move to Tsugen Island overnight. Following a preliminary air and naval bombardment, which saw some Japanese mortar fire in response, Winn’s 3rd Battalion successfully landed on the morning of April 10. The Americans then advanced inland with light resistance, quickly securing the northern part of the island but failing to overrun the entrenched enemy positions in Tsugen village. The assault continued the next day against persistent opposition, but organized resistance gradually diminished, allowing the Americans to secure the rest of the island by nightfall, marking the conclusion of the Eastern Islands operation. On April 11, General Shepherd’s Marines continued to probe for the main enemy positions in northern Okinawa; the 1st Battalion, 22nd Marines patrolled eastward from their new base at Shana Wan, while the 29th Marines advanced toward Manna. Due to this progress, Buckner decided to fully merge Phases I and II, ordering the 77th Division to capture Iejima on April 16. To the south, Colonel Albert Stebbins’s 106th Regiment was attached to the 96th Division, moving toward that division's reserve area, while Colonel Gerard Kelley’s 165th Regiment relieved the 17th Regiment in the corps service area. Most significantly, General Bradley continued his attacks on Kakazu Ridge, with the 1st Battalion, 381st Regiment attempting to assault the western slopes but halted short of the ridge crest by determined defenders. At the same time, the 3rd Battalion, 383rd Regiment pushed up the northwest slopes of Kakazu Ridge but was also pinned down by intense Japanese fire.

Simultaneously, following an intense artillery bombardment, the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment finally succeeded in breaking into Ouki. However, additional reinforcements were thwarted by heavy Japanese fire, forcing the troops to retreat. With no further advancements, the 7th Division and the 382nd Regiment were relegated to patrolling and mopping up their designated areas over the next few days. At sea, Admiral Ugaki resumed his kamikaze assaults that day, damaging the carriers Essex and Enterprise, the battleship Missouri, and eight destroyers. However, his primary operation commenced on April 12, when he launched approximately 380 aircraft for a second mass Kikisui attack, primarily targeting Admiral Turner’s Task Force 51 west of Okinawa. Thanks to cryptanalysis warnings, Turner scrambled his own fighter planes, which successfully shot down 298 Japanese aircraft. Despite attempting numerous missions, Kanoya’s specially trained 721st Kokutai Jinrai-Butai “Divine Thunder” unit had so far failed to launch a single Ohka suicide rocket against the Americans. On April 12, however, eight Betty bombers would finally launch six Ohkas against the 5th Fleet, although five Betties never returned. At RPS-14, about 70nm northwest of Okinawa, a Zero plowed into Mannert L. Abele’s engine room at 14:40, its 500lb bomb exploding and leaving the destroyer dead in the water. One minute later an Ohka came screaming in at 575mph, slammed into Mannert L. Abele and exploded. She sank in five minutes, losing 97 dead. Mannert L. Abele was the first destroyer hit by an Ohka and the last sunk by one. Destroyer-minesweeper Jeffers, en route to assist Mannert L. Abele, observed a twin-engined bomber eight miles away drop a smoking “belly tank” that suddenly rocketed towards Jeffers “at terrific speed.” Numerous 40mm hits and hard maneuvering saw the Ohka miss Jeffers astern and disintegrate. Additionally 3 battleships, 14 destroyers, 2 destroyer minesweepers, and another landing craft were damaged. Meanwhile, Admiral Rawlings’ Task Force 57 was ordered to strike the Shinchiku and Matsuyama airfields in northern Formosa, and over the next two days, 48 Avengers and 40 fighters successfully attacked Shinchiku and Kiirun Harbor. On Okinawa, the 6th Reconnaissance Company captured Bise Saki with minimal resistance, while the 29th Marines faced significant opposition southeast of Manna near Mount Yae-Take, indicating where the main enemy forces were located. This prompted Shepherd to reposition the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines to Awa as his new divisional reserve. At the same time, Japanese guerrillas managed to retake Ishikawa, which they would hold for the following two days.

Facing south, the 96th Division made another attempt to capture Kakazu but was once again thwarted by the determined defenders. By this time, approximately 5,750 Japanese soldiers were estimated to have been killed in the southern region, while the 24th Corps suffered losses of 451 men killed, 2,198 wounded, and 241 missing. In the afternoon of April 12, 1945, in Warm Springs, Georgia, while sitting for a portrait by Elizabeth Shoumatoff, President Franklin D. Roosevelt said: "I have a terrific headache." He then slumped forward in his chair, unconscious, and was carried into his bedroom. The president's attending cardiologist, Howard Bruenn, diagnosed a massive intracerebral hemorrhage. At 3:35 pm, Roosevelt died at the age of 63. His declining health had been kept secret from the public, leading to shock and sorrow worldwide upon the news of his death. Harry Truman, who was serving as vice president in 1945, succeeded FDR as president. Meanwhile, back in Okinawa, Fujioka initiated his counteroffensive after a heavy artillery bombardment, advancing his four battalions to secretly infiltrate the American lines. On the eastern front, the 22nd Regiment struggled to advance due to becoming disoriented in unfamiliar terrain.

The night attacks suffered from several unexpected problems. Heavy shelling had changed the landscape, blasting away villages and thickets, so that even though night infiltrators knew their maps and thought they knew the terrain, they lacked the landmarks needed to tell them where they actually were. Moreover, frequent illumination shells forced the eyes of night infiltrators to adjust so many times that their capacity to adjust was lost. They became temporarily blinded and so were unable to move. Because of the unfamiliar terrain and flash blindness, the Japanese night fighters had difficulty reaching their assigned objectives. In fact, it was hard for them to reach their jumping-off points. Continuous naval bombardment of crossroads and bridges forced units to rush across in small groups between shells so that the units became strung out on the roads and difficult to control. It was hard to move heavy ammunition and supplies forward because of these interdiction points and the generally churned up roads. Even when units reached their northward assembly points safely by night, they were immediately exposed to aerial observation and artillery fire at dawn, since they lacked enough time to dig in. Units that attacked across American lines safely in darkness had the same problem: they lacked time to dig in and so were utterly exposed to artillery fire at morning light. Night attacks, like flanking maneuvers, were a kind of cure-all in prewar Japanese doctrine. But they failed to provide the expeditious results on Okinawa that IJA doctrine had led the 32d Army Staff to expect.

Consequently, Yoshida’s four infiltration attempts, each involving about a squad, were effectively repelled by troops from the 32nd, 184th, and 382nd Regiments before midnight. The only significant attack came from around 45 Japanese soldiers against the positions held by Company G of the 184th, which quickly returned fire, forcing the enemy to retreat to their caves and trenches. In contrast, the assault on the 96th Division on the western front was intense, sustained, and well-coordinated. The forward units of Major-General Nakajima Tokutaro’s 63rd Brigade launched their own local offensive to maintain pressure on the thin line held by the 382nd and 383rd Regiments, while elements from the 23rd, 272nd, and 273rd Independent Battalions infiltrated the American lines and moved into the Ginowan area.

The majority of the 272nd Division launched an assault on American positions at Kakazu Ridge, enduring intense naval and artillery fire but ultimately being repelled by the determined defenders after several hours of combat. By morning, the bodies of 317 enemy soldiers were counted on the ridge, whereas the Americans suffered 50 casualties. Meanwhile, the 273rd Division attacked along the west coast against the recently arrived 2nd Battalion of the 106th Regiment, which decisively repelled the Japanese assault and nearly annihilated the independent battalion. Despite this, some units from the 23rd and 272nd Independent Battalions managed to penetrate approximately 1,000 yards behind American lines between Nishibaru and Kaniku but became isolated after dawn on April 13. Throughout the day, Bradley's troops worked to eliminate these infiltrators, many of whom detonated explosives when trapped. When these units retreated into Japanese lines later that night, only half of their original numbers had survived. Just before midnight, the reserve 9th Company of the 22nd Regiment launched an attack against the 184th Regiment following preparatory artillery fire, but this offensive was quickly disrupted by artillery, mortars, and machine-gun fire. On April 14, Nakajima’s forces attempted two more assaults on Kakazu in the early hours, but these attempts were similarly thwarted by artillery and machine-gun fire. Given the failures of the offensives, Ushijima had no choice but to order a suspension of the attack, resulting in a shift to a defensive posture for the Japanese. Over the two days of combat, the 24th Corps reported killing 1,594 Japanese soldiers and capturing four, with losses of fewer than 100 American troops.

In the northern region, an extensive air and naval bombardment of Iejima commenced while the Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion landed on Minna Island, securing it without encountering resistance to position artillery units for General Bruce’s upcoming attack, which would involve the 305th and 306th Regiments. Meanwhile, in northern Okinawa, the 29th Marines continued to advance against enemy positions at Yae-Take through vigorous patrolling, preparing for a morning assault the next day. Concerned about the pace of progress, Shepherd relieved Colonel Bleasdale of command, replacing him with veteran Colonel William Whaling. However, Shepherd recognized that taking the 1,200-foot summit would require more than one regiment, so he ordered the 4th Marines to move from the east coast to Yofuke and then to the southwest corner of the Motobu Peninsula. Additionally, Colonel Shapley’s 3rd Battalion was tasked with moving to Kawada, while the reinforced 2nd Battalion of the 22nd Marines rapidly advanced up the west coast to secure Hedo Misaki. On April 14, Shepherd initiated a coordinated assault on Yae-Take, with Whaling’s 3rd Battalion and Shapley’s 2nd Battalion advancing from the area around Toguchi against unexpectedly light resistance, while the rest of the 29th Marines moved out from Itomi to clear the Itomi-Toguchi Road. Although the eastern front faced strong opposition and required a change in strategy to advance southwesterly for better elevation advantage, rapid progress was made on the west, prompting Shapley to commit his reserve 1st Battalion to secure the exposed right flank.

At the same time, Whaling’s 3rd Battalion and Shapley’s 2nd Battalion continued their advance against significantly strengthened enemy resistance, ultimately capturing another ridge located 1,000 yards ahead. Initial opposition consisted of small enemy groups. These hostile covering forces employed every available means to delay and disorganize the advance, and to mislead the attackers as to the location of the battle position. The Japanese would lie in concealment, with weapons zeroed in on a portion of a trail, allowing a considerable number of Marines to pass before opening up on a choice target. An entire platoon was permitted to pass a point on a trail without interference, but when the company commander reached that point with his headquarters section, a burst of machine-gun fire killed him and several others. Officer casualties were excessively high. In an area in which there had been no firing for over half an hour, Major Bernard W. Green, commanding the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, was killed instantly by machine-gun fire. No one else was hurt, although Major Green was standing with his operations and intelligence officers on either side of him. Lieutenant Colonel Fred D. Beans, Regimental Executive Officer, assumed command of the battalion. "It was like fighting a phantom enemy." For while the hills and ravines were apparently swarming with Japanese, it was difficult to close with them. The small enemy groups, usually built around a heavy Hotchkiss machine gun augmented by Nambus, would frequently change positions in the dense vegetation. Hostile volleys elicited furious Marine fusillades into the area from whence the firing had come. But after laboriously working their way to the spot, the Marines came upon only an occasional bloodstain on the ground. Neither live nor dead Japanese were to be found. One Marine registered his impression of these tactics by blurting out, "Jeez, they've all got Nambus, but where are they?"

Meanwhile, the 29th Marines advanced 800 yards up steep slopes despite facing fierce opposition; however, the 1st Battalion eventually found itself pinned down by intense Japanese gunfire. Additionally, Shapley’s 3rd Battalion crossed the island via motor march to relieve the 3rd Battalion of the 22nd Marines in division reserve, which then returned to its patrol base at Majiya. To the south, Hodge recognized the need for a full-scale effort to penetrate the fortified Shuri area, so he scheduled a corps attack involving three divisions abreast for April 19. In preparation, he dedicated the following four days to organizing the assault, with the 27th Division taking over from the 96th Division in the western region of its zone, while smaller local attacks were conducted to enhance forward positions. Aware of the impending major attack, the Japanese used this preparatory period to bolster their defenses with additional supporting weapons. Back to the north, on April 15, most of the 29th Marines consolidated their defenses on high ground and exerted constant pressure on the rear of the Yae-Take position through vigorous patrols to the west and northwest. On the other hand, Whaling’s 3rd Battalion advanced east and south approximately 900 yards amidst heavy machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fire before being halted by a strong enemy position on Hill 210. Additionally, the 4th Marines faced fierce resistance as Shapley’s battalions finally secured Hill 200 and a critical hill mass just southwest of Yae-Take.

Fully aware that his primary positions would soon be overrun, Colonel Udo decided to transition to guerrilla tactics by nightfall, relocating his command to the mountainous regions of northern Okinawa via Itomi. In light of these developments, the 1st Battalion, 22nd Marines was placed into division reserve at Awa to allow Shapley’s 3rd Battalion to prepare for the following day’s assault. On April 16, the offensive resumed, with Whaling’s 3rd Battalion swiftly capturing Hill 210 in conjunction with Shapley’s 2nd Battalion. Meanwhile, the rest of the 4th Marines secured a ridge just below Yae-Take by midday, while the 29th Marines applied continuous pressure on the rear of Udo’s fortified stronghold.

While the 4th Marines was storming the fortified position on Yae-Take, the 29th Marines maintained relentless pressure against its rear. The opposition which faced the 29th was similar to that on the front of the 4th. From log-revetted bunkers and occasional concrete emplacements the enemy resisted the advance with increasing stubbornness, supported by machine-guns, mortars, and artillery concealed in ravines and in caves on the high ground. Rugged terrain and an acute supply situation also contributed to the difficulties confronting the 29th Marines in accomplishing its task of clearing the high ground flanking the Itomi-Toguchi Road. The enemy displayed his usual ability to exploit the terrain and derived the maximum benefit from his weapons emplaced in caves and pits and concealed by natural cover. Particularly noteworthy was his use of 20mm dual-purpose cannon against personnel. Fire from these weapons on battalion CPs was a daily occurrence. All roads and natural avenues of approach were covered. Any attempt to move over the easier routes was met with bitter and effective resistance. Consequently, "the method of reducing the enemy positions followed a pattern of 'ridgehopping'," covered by the fires of all supporting weapons. This tactic enabled the attacker to envelop the hostile defenses and reduce them in detail. Numerous abandoned positions and weapons encountered by the 29th indicated that the determination of the Japanese to resist diminished considerably when they were taken from the flank. In contrast to a coordinated advance with all units in contact across a broad front, the action in the zone of the 29th Marines was characterized by attacks that, even when delivered simultaneously, constituted a series of local patrol actions to seize critical positions, followed by mopping up activity within the area.

In the afternoon, Shapley’s 1st and 3rd Battalions assaulted the formidable mountain, gradually making their way up the steep slope under light and scattered small-arms fire. However, as the Marines reached the peak, they encountered intense fire at close range, which quickly forced them to pull back. After a fierce and close engagement, the 1st Battalion ultimately regained control of Yae-Take, managing to hold the summit against strong Japanese counterattacks, aided by artillery support and Shapley’s 2nd Battalion. Meanwhile, at dawn on April 16, two battleships, four cruisers, and seven destroyers under Rear-Admiral Bertram Rodgers launched a heavy bombardment on Iejima, while aircraft bombed and rocketed the island, dropping tanks of napalm on and behind the beaches.

Approximately 2,000 Japanese troops, led by Major Igawa Masashi, had destroyed Iejima’s airfields and strengthened the central eastern region of the island in an effort to entice the invaders to approach the vulnerable southeastern beaches. Their aim was to annihilate them with concentrated fire from numerous hidden positions in the Pinnacle and the town of Ie. However, the Americans saw through this strategy. Bruce’s plan involved landing Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Coolidge’s 305th Regiment on the Red Beaches along the southern coast of Iejima and Colonel Aubrey Smith’s 306th Regiment on the Green Beach at the island’s southwest tip. The 305th was tasked with advancing eastward to capture additional landing areas, while the 306th was to move north and take control of the airfield. Both regiments would then focus on neutralizing enemy strongholds at the island's eastern end. Following intense air and naval bombardments, amphibious tanks and subsequent waves of amphibious tractors surged toward the landing beaches that morning, supported by rocket fire from LCI gunboats. At 07:58, the forward elements of the 1st Battalion, 305th Regiment successfully landed on the southern coast of Iejima, just south of the airfield, while the 3rd Battalion landed on a different beach, 600 yards to the left, three minutes later. At 08:07, the first waves of the 306th Regiment made landfall on Green Beach. The 305th moved swiftly inland over high dunes and then turned east toward Ie, while the 306th advanced 2,000 yards inland to the airfield's western edge, with the reserve 3rd Battalion securing the island’s western end. By the afternoon, the troops advanced rapidly, seizing the airfield with only light resistance, achieving a total gain of about 5,500 yards by nightfall. Conversely, the 305th faced stiffer opposition on its way to Ie, managing to advance only about 800 yards eastward while defending against strong nighttime counterattacks.

During the night of 16 April the enemy launched a coordinated attack on the 3d Battalion of the 305th. The attack came with suicidal recklessness. The Japanese were supported by mortars and 70-mm. guns, and were armed with small arms, sharpened stakes, bags of hand grenades, and literally hundreds of satchel charges, some of which had been improvised from mortar shells. Japanese worked up to the perimeters in small groups and either threw their satchel charges at close range or blew themselves up in an effort to take Americans with them. Some of the human bombs were successful, but most of the Japanese were killed before they came within effective range. One American had his arm broken by the flying leg of a Japanese soldier who had blown himself up. After hours of wild fighting in the dark the enemy withdrew, leaving 152 of his dead in and around the 3d Battalion's position.

While back at sea, Admiral Mitscher’s Task Force 58 had effectively launched attacks on Amami Oshima, Tokunoshima, Kikaijima, and southern Kyushu over the past four days, the Japanese responded with a series of scattered kamikaze assaults that caused damage to the battleship New York and four destroyers. On April 16, Ugaki initiated his third large-scale Kikisui attack, acutely aware that another failure in the air could spell the doom of Operation Ten-Go. Despite Mitscher's preemptive strikes against Kyushu, where Americans claimed to have destroyed 202 aircraft and damaged 79 at the cost of only nine planes, at least 289 Japanese attackers were still able to launch missions against Spruance’s 5th Fleet. Although American interceptors and anti-aircraft fire recorded another 217 kills, the surviving kamikaze pilots managed to sink the destroyer Pringle and inflict damage on the carrier Intrepid, the battleship Missouri, three destroyers, two destroyer minesweepers, and two landing craft. Notably, the destroyer Laffey withstood six kamikaze impacts, four bomb hits, and numerous strafing runs, resulting in 32 fatalities and 71 injuries among its crew. The following day, a smaller attack on April 17 resulted in additional damage to the light carrier Bataan and one destroyer, yet Americans claimed another 49 kills. However, Ugaki had exhausted much of his strength since the invasion began and was left with approximately 598 operational planes. Meanwhile, fighting continued in northern Okinawa, where some surviving troops from Udo advanced toward Nakaoshi to escape the Motobu Peninsula. Supported by heavy artillery barrages and battleship gunfire, the 29th Marines slowly progressed over challenging terrain, encountering only light resistance, as they successfully secured the mountainous area ahead and connected with the 4th Marines.

Shapley’s 1st and 3rd Battalions continued their push northward toward the Itomi-Toguchi Road, swiftly advancing downhill and completely overwhelming all Japanese defenses in the region. By nightfall, the 4th and 29th Marines had positioned themselves along the elevated terrain overlooking the Itomi-Toguchi Road. The 305th resumed its assault, aiming to capture the high ground behind Red Beaches 3 and 4. The 1st Battalion encountered only minimal resistance along the coast, allowing them to make significant progress, while the 3rd Battalion quickly secured the high ground in its area before being halted by intense machine-gun fire from caves in the coral slopes to the north. A maneuvering strategy followed by an infantry-tank assault eventually neutralized this enemy position, enabling the advance to continue steadily until the 3rd Battalion reached the outskirts of Ie. Due to the strong resistance faced, Bruce opted to deploy Colonel Stephen Hamilton's 307th Regiment on the beaches southwest of Ie. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were subsequently landed there and launched an attack northeast, quickly advancing approximately 400 yards despite increasingly fierce resistance, ultimately being halted by heavy enemy fire from Bloody Ridge and Government House Hill. Meanwhile, the 306th Regiment maintained its defensive position while probing the enemy’s fortifications around Iegusugu. The next day, the 306th began to pivot its right flank and launched an attack toward the Pinnacle with two battalions, making notable progress throughout the day. Concurrently, the 307th continued its advance into Ie despite facing heavy resistance, quickly reaching a standstill in front of Government House Hill.

As a result, with the 2nd Battalion effectively immobilized, the decision was made to deploy the 3rd Battalion around to the right flank to launch an assault toward the northeast in the eastern part of the town, while the 3rd Battalion of the 305th Regiment advanced eastward toward Iegusugu. After a heavy preparation by the artillery on Minna Shima, the 3d Battalion, 305th, attacked at 1130 on an 800-yard front. A house-to-house fight ensued amid the rubble of Ie. "Every street became a phase line," one observer reported. The necessity of forming a connecting link over the wide area between the 306th and the 307th made the fight harder. Artillery was ineffective against many enemy positions and could not be used freely because other friendly units were so close by. Self-propelled guns were held up by mines and debris in the narrow streets. After working about halfway through the northwestern section of the town, the troops withdrew to a more secure position on the outskirts, their right (south) flank then being 500 yards west of Government House Hill, and their left (north) flank 100 yards west of the base of Iegusugu. They had made a net gain of only about 350 yards for the day.

Similarly, Hamilton's 3rd Battalion achieved moderate success, advancing to a position 300 yards north of the village of Agarii-mae. To protect its right flank, the 1st Battalion of the 305th Regiment positioned itself alongside the 3rd Battalion of the 307th Regiment and launched a northern attack, gaining approximately 1000 yards by day's end before withdrawing to a position about 600 yards east of Agarii-mae. Medium tanks and self-propelled guns covered the gap that developed between the two battalions of the 307th. These weapons put direct fire into caves, pillboxes, and enemy gun positions in the town of Ie and the Pinnacle. They could not be moved close to the enemy positions, however; deadly machine-gun and mortar fire held the infantry back and left the armor vulnerable to suicide attacks by Japanese armed with satchel charges, who hid in holes until the tanks and guns came within range.

Meanwhile, after four days of intense fighting, activities in the Motobu area on April 18 were limited to reorganization, consolidating the gains from the previous day, patrolling the Itomi-Toguchi Road, and resupplying. Looking south, Griner called for a nighttime preliminary attack to secure the Machinato Inlet and the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. As the area was shrouded in smoke during the afternoon, Company G of the 106th Regiment swiftly crossed the inlet and successfully secured Machinato by nightfall, while bridges were constructed at the inlet. The 106th then moved across the bridges, stealthily advancing toward the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment without encountering opposition. Near the summit, the troops launched a surprise ambush against the defenders, ultimately forcing the Japanese to retreat in chaos. With the escarpment secured by dawn, the 106th was prepared to participate in the general attack to the south.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The first Okinawa counteroffensive, as part of Operation Ten-Ichi-Go was not achieving results. Despite overwhelming sacrifices of men and supplies, it seemed hopeless for the Japanese on Okinawa. Those like Colonel Yahara could see the paint on the wall, much to their growing depression.

- 178 - Pacific War Podcast - The First Okinawa Counteroffensive - April 15 - 22 - , 1945

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