Last time we spoke about the invasion of Luzon. As Operation Mike 1 commenced, General Swift’s 1st Corps prepared to assault Lingayen Gulf while General Griswold’s 14th Corps rehearsed at Huon Gulf. Despite successful diversionary strikes, Japanese forces anticipated an invasion. On January 2, enemy ships were spotted heading towards Luzon, confirming fears of a large-scale operation. Kamikaze attacks intensified, damaging Allied vessels, including the USS Long, which sank after being hit. Amidst bombardments, Filipino citizens demonstrated resilience despite the destruction, reflecting their loyalty and hope during the turmoil. As dawn broke on January 9, Kinkaid’s amphibious convoys approached Lingayen Gulf, initiating a fierce assault. Preceded by heavy bombardments, American forces landed on the beaches, facing minimal resistance. The 14th Corps advanced toward key locations, while the 1st Corps secured strategic positions despite enduring sniper fire. By nightfall, they established a significant beachhead. Despite sporadic Japanese counterattacks, American troops pressed forward, and reinforcements were deployed to maintain momentum. The stage was set for a crucial campaign in Luzon.

This episode is the South China Sea Raid

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

As we last left off, the 1st and 14th Corps had just successfully established a beachhead on Lingayen Gulf. On January 11, General Krueger further reinforced his position by landing additional reserves, aiming to effectively confront the formidable enemy forces entrenched in the eastern hills. Concurrently, Admiral Halsey’s 3rd Fleet units made their entrance into the South China Sea to execute an ambitious raid known as Operation Gratitude. This operation was prompted by misleading intelligence reports suggesting that the hybrid battleship-carriers Ise and Hyuga were stationed in Cam Ranh Bay. In response, Halsey ordered Admiral Bogan’s Task Group 38.2 to launch an assault on these supposed targets. This task group was primarily composed of the battleships New Jersey and Wisconsin, which were directed to bombard the bay and eliminate any Japanese vessels that had sustained damage from prior airstrikes.

To enhance their operational capabilities, Halsey established Task Group 38.5, specifically designed for night operations, which included the night-capable carriers Enterprise and Independence. On January 12, aircraft from these carriers were deployed for a predawn reconnaissance mission over Cam Ranh Bay and its adjacent waters in search of enemy targets. Despite their efforts, the search yielded no results, indicating that the earlier intelligence had been inaccurate. Nevertheless, all three carrier groups proceeded with their planned strikes at 07:30, while the surface action group advanced toward Cam Ranh.

Halsey’s strategic gamble proved to be remarkably successful. Although the Ise and Hyuga were not present in the bay, American aviators discovered a wealth of enemy shipping, including three significant Japanese convoys. Sherman’s TG 38.3 encountered the most valuable target off Qui Nhon north of Cam Ranh. This was convoy Hi-86 with nine merchants and a heavy escort. The convoy had departed Cape St Jacques on January 9 and was headed north. The escort comprised light cruiser Kashii and five kaibokan. Late on January 11, it reached Qui Nhon Bay and anchored. After leaving Qui Nhon Bay, it was discovered by TG 38.3. In two large attacks, aircraft from Essex, Ticonderoga, Langley, and San Jacinto laid waste to the convoy. None of the nine merchant ships in the convoy survived this onslaught. Cargo ships Yoshu Maru and Eiman Maru (loaded with bauxite and raw rubber), along with tanker San Luis Maru, were sunk. The other six ships were damaged and forced to beach. Otsusan Maru (a cargo ship converted to tanker), passenger-cargo ship Tatebe Maru, cargo ship Kyokuun Maru, cargo ship Yusei Maru, ore carrier Tatsubato Maru, and cargo ship Banshu Maru No. 63 all became constructive total losses. The escort for this large convoy met a similar fate. Light cruiser Kashii was hit amidships by a torpedo in the early afternoon. This was followed by two bomb hits aft that detonated her depth-charge magazine. Kashii sank stern first with 621 members of her crew; only 19 survived. CD-23 was attacked north of Qui Nhon and sunk with her entire crew of 155 officers and men. CD-51 suffered the same fate. After she blew up and sank, her depth charges detonated with fatal consequences for any survivors; 159 men were lost. From the entire convoy, only kaibokans Daito and Ukuru, and corvette CD-27 survived, albeit in a damaged state.

As a result, Admiral McCain’s Task Force 38 conducted an impressive total of 984 strike missions throughout the day. This relentless assault led to the sinking of the light cruiser Kashii, two minesweepers, eight kaibokans, two subchasers, five transport ships, fourteen cargo vessels, and nine oilers. Additionally, four kaibokans, one subchaser, three transports, four cargo ships, and two oilers were damaged. This operation marked the highest number of ships sunk by airstrikes in a single day during the war, showcasing the effectiveness of the American air campaign and the critical role of intelligence in naval warfare.

In addition to inflicting significant damage on Japanese shipping, the aviators under Admiral Halsey achieved remarkable success by claiming the destruction of 113 enemy aircraft, both in the air and on the ground, while sustaining the loss of 23 American aircraft. The impact of these operations extended beyond aerial engagements; critical infrastructure was also targeted. Airfields, docks, and oil storage facilities located between Tourane and Saigon suffered considerable damage. Notably, the railway station in Nha Trang and a vital bridge on the route connecting Saigon to Bien Hoa were also affected, disrupting transportation and supply lines.

Meanwhile, Bogan’s surface strike group was unable to locate any Japanese vessels during their operations and instead focused their firepower on bombarding Cam Ranh Bay, further demonstrating the ongoing conflict's intensity.

Turning to the situation in Luzon, the 1st and 14th Corps were poised to advance their offensives. To the west, the 185th Regiment and the 40th Reconnaissance Troop initiated a push toward the recently vacated Port Sual. The 160th Regiment maintained a watchful presence at Aguilar, while patrols from the 148th Regiment ventured into towns occupied by guerrilla forces, specifically Urbiztondo and Bayambang. In the eastern sector, the 6th Division was temporarily held back to prevent the creation of a potentially hazardous gap along the front of the 1st Corps. However, the reinforced 43rd Division continued its advance against the most formidable Japanese defenses encountered on Luzon to date. Along the coastline, the 158th Regiment dispatched patrols into Damortis, discovering the town largely deserted. The 172nd Regiment attempted an attack on Hill 580, which ultimately proved unsuccessful, while the 63rd Regiment was deployed to close the widening gap between the 158th and 172nd Regiments.

The primary objective of these coordinated efforts was to defeat Major-General Sato Bunzo’s 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and secure control of the Damortis-Rosario road. The Damortis-Rosario road, a 2-lane, concrete-paved section of Route 3, led east from the junction of Route 3 and the coast road at Damortis, about 8 miles north of San Fabian, to the junction of Routes 3 and 11, 8 miles inland and a mile east of Rosario. Seizure of the Damortis-Rosario stretch of Route 3 would present 1st Corps with an easy means of access to Route 11, in turn providing a 2-lane asphalt-paved axis of advance toward Baguio along the deep valley of the Bued River. Equally important, if the 1st Corps could quickly gain control over the Damortis-Rosario road and the Routes 3-11 junction, the corps could largely overcome the threat of counterattack against the 6th Army's beachhead from the north and northeast. The Damortis-Rosario road ran sometimes across wooded ravines and sometimes over ridge tops for 3/4 of the way to Rosario, and then continued across open farm land and through Rosario to a junction with Route 11. The road was dominated by broken ridges and steep-sided hills to both the north and the south for the first 5 miles inland. South of the road the hills and ridges were grass-covered; to the north many of the draws and ravines contained thick scrub growth. Bare, steep heights north, northeast, and east of Rosario controlled the Routes 3-11 junction. The 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, defending the Damortis-Rosario road, had all the advantages of observation, while the relatively soft rock and dirt mixture of the hills and ridges gave the brigade ample opportunity to indulge in what was soon to appear to the 1st Corps as the Japanese Army's favorite occupation--digging caves and tunnels. Achieving this would mitigate the threat of a counterattack against the 6th Army's beachhead from the north and northeast. With the security of its left flank assured, the 14th Corps could then accelerate its advance toward General Krueger’s main objective: the Central Plains-Manila Bay region. This strategic maneuvering was crucial for consolidating American forces and ensuring a successful campaign in the Philippines.

At the same time, the 169th Regiment faced ongoing challenges at Hill 318 and the southern part of the Japanese-held third ridgeline, while the 103rd Regiment made unsuccessful attempts to advance toward the Hill 200 complex, which was firmly defended by the 2nd Battalion, 64th Regiment. Meanwhile, General Tominaga executed his final large-scale kamikaze attack during the Philippines Campaign, successfully damaging two destroyer escorts, one destroyer transport, and five merchant ships. The final attacks were recorded on January 13. Only two suicide aircraft were dispatched, both IJA Ki-84 Franks. One surprised the crew of escort carrier Salamaua. Unengaged by antiaircraft fire, the Frank hit amidships. One of the aircraft’s bombs exploded on the hangar deck and the second passed through the ship creating a hole near the waterline. The carrier was left without power while major fires took hold. Damage control was ultimately successful, but not before 15 were killed and 88 wounded. Salamaua was out of the war until April. Also on this day, attack transport Zeilin was hit by a probable IJN aircraft conducting an impromptu suicide attack.

Ultimately, the 4th Air Army was scheduled to evacuate to Formosa on January 15, marking the end of the threat from Japanese air power in the Philippines, although the Allies were not yet aware of this. Since the initial kamikaze assault on the Mindoro-bound convoys on December 13, Japanese aircraft had sunk 24 vessels and damaged 67 others. Casualties from these air attacks aboard ships were approximately 1,230 men killed and 1,800 wounded, while the Allies estimated they had destroyed around 600 Japanese aircraft during the same timeframe. Back in Lingayen Gulf on January 13, the 172nd Regiment once again advanced up the grassy, steep slopes of Hill 580, successfully securing most of the area against fierce resistance. Simultaneously, the 63rd Regiment attacked north from Hill 247 and captured Hill 363, despite lacking artillery support.

Artillery support was to have been provided by the 43rd Division's 155-mm. howitzer battalion, the 192nd Field Artillery Battalion, since the 63rd Regiment's own 105-mm. battalion had been sent south with the rest of the 6th Division. Unfortunately, the 192nd Field Artillery did not learn it was to support the 63rd until after dark on January 12, and could not start moving to good close support positions until daylight on the 13th, after the 63rd had started its attack. Unlike a 105-mm. battalion, the 192nd did not normally operate in direct support roles and lacked the forward observers and communications the lighter battalions possessed. The 192nd might therefore have been expected to take some time to prepare for its direct support mission, but the battalion reported it could have provided some support--with at least one battery--by noon on the 13th had not Colonel Ralph C. Holliday, commanding the 63rd Regiment, insisted that wire be laid for artillery liaison officers and forward observers, a job that was not completed for almost 36 hours. Colonel Holliday may have been influenced in his decision by the fact that the artillery's SCR-610 radio did not work efficiently in the broken terrain of the middle ridge line where the 63rd was attacking. It was not, indeed, until the 43rd Division had supplied the 192nd Field Artillery with infantry SCR-300 sets that the battalion was able to establish satisfactory radio communications. Then, on January 14, the first radio brought up to the battalion's forward observers was promptly destroyed by Japanese artillery, which also cut wire that had already been laid. Support was again delayed, so the entire battalion was not in position and ready to give the 63rd Regiment the support it needed until midafternoon on January 15. Meanwhile the 169th Regiment completed the clearing of the southern end of the ridgeline, while the 103rd Regiment continued its unsuccessful efforts to take Hill 200.

To the west, the 6th Division established a fortified line extending from Malasiqui to Manaoag. They promptly dispatched reconnaissance units to the east and south to gather intelligence on enemy movements. The 185th Regiment achieved a significant victory by successfully assaulting Port Sual, while the 160th Regiment engaged in several skirmishes with the reinforced 23rd Reconnaissance Regiment, which had retreated from Port Sual at the onset of the conflict. Meanwhile, patrols from the 148th Regiment advanced into Wawa, strategically located between Bayambang and Urbiztondo. The following day, the 185th Regiment continued its momentum by capturing the crucial road junction town of Alaminos on the Bolinao Peninsula. Some of its elements also pushed northward toward Cabalitan Bay, where they discovered that Allied Naval Forces had already landed to establish a seaplane base, enhancing their operational capabilities in the region.

Looking to the east, the 103rd Regiment made gradual but consistent progress along Hill 200, while the 169th Regiment executed a costly frontal assault to clear Hill 318, suffering significant casualties in the process. The 172nd Regiment advanced north along the third ridge, successfully seizing Hill 565 despite facing scattered resistance. The 63rd Regiment continued its slow advance northward, persistently harassed by Japanese artillery and mortar fire, which impeded their progress. Additionally, the 158th Regiment initiated an offensive toward Rosario but was quickly compelled to retreat due to intense Japanese artillery and machine-gun fire. In contrast, General Yamashita, while cautious about launching a major counteroffensive, recognized the necessity of limited offensive actions to regain the initiative. He believed that such actions would effectively disrupt the enemy's advance inland. Consequently, he ordered General Nishiyama’s 23rd Division to conduct a robust raiding attack against the San Fabian-Alacan sector during the night of January 16. This strategic decision aimed to exploit the element of surprise and inflict damage on the enemy forces, thereby buying time for his troops to regroup and fortify their positions.

In a strategic initiative aimed at maximizing the destruction of enemy weaponry, supplies, and critical base installations, the 58th Brigade, along with the 71st and 72nd Regiments, was instructed to assemble specialized "suicide" raiding units. These units comprised carefully selected soldiers, heavily armed with automatic firearms and supported by demolition teams trained for explosive operations. In addition, a fourth unit was to be formed from the Shigemi Detachment of the 2nd Armored Division, which had recently positioned itself on the southern flank of the 23rd Division. This unit would consist of a mobile infantry company and a medium tank company. The operational plan called for these units to breach the enemy’s beachhead perimeter simultaneously at various locations on January 17. Their objective was to swiftly execute their missions and then withdraw to safety. As preparations for this limited counteroffensive unfolded, the American forces continued their own offensive operations, which had commenced on January 15.

In this context, the 158th Regiment launched an eastward assault, successfully advancing approximately 1,000 yards. Meanwhile, the 63rd Regiment cautiously pushed forward over a mile and a half northward from Hill 363. The 172nd Regiment made a rapid advance to the Cataguintingan road junction, effectively establishing a battalion at the edge of Route 3, about a mile and a half west of Rosario. In contrast, the 169th Regiment encountered challenges during a two-pronged attack on Hill 355, leading General Wing to order the regiment to bypass the hill to the south and reposition overland to Route 3 at barrio Palacpalac. Conversely, the 103rd Regiment achieved significant success in their assault on the Hill 200 complex. Further to the west, patrols from the 185th Regiment advanced westward, successfully reaching Dasol Bay. Additionally, a battalion from the 129th Regiment crossed the Agno River at Wawa and continued south along a dusty gravel road toward Camiling. Other elements of the 160th Regiment also moved down from Aguilar to Camiling, consolidating their position in the area.

After completing refueling operations over the previous days, Task Force 38 resumed its northern advance to launch an assault on Formosa on January 15. Despite Admiral McCain's recommendation to cancel the strike due to inclement weather conditions, Admiral Halsey opted to proceed with the operation. As a result, a series of airstrikes were executed against Formosa and the Pescadores Islands throughout the day. The 16 fighter sweeps conducted during this operation managed to destroy only 16 Japanese aircraft in the air and an additional 18 on the ground. However, the bombing missions targeting enemy shipping proved more effective, leading to the sinking of the destroyers Hatakaze and Tsuga, along with one transport vessel and two merchant ships, albeit at the cost of losing 12 American aircraft.

Following these strikes, Task Force 38 redirected its course toward Hong Kong, which came under attack on January 16. Unfortunately, the American forces encountered severe weather conditions and faced intense anti-aircraft fire. This resulted in a limited success, with the Americans sinking just one transport ship, five oilers, one cargo vessel, and one guardboat. Additionally, they inflicted damage on the destroyer Hasu, three destroyer escorts, one corvette, one transport, and one oiler. The strikes also caused significant destruction to key infrastructure, including Kai Tak Airport, the Kowloon and Taikoo docks, the Aberdeen dockyard, the Kowloon-Canton railway, and the Macau Naval Aviation Center. In a broader campaign, the Americans executed secondary strikes against Canton and Hainan Island, as well as targeting several airfields along the Chinese coast, particularly between the Leizhou Peninsula and Swatow. However, this ambitious operation came at a steep cost, with Task Force 38 suffering a total loss of 49 aircraft—27 due to operational issues and 22 as a result of enemy action. With the South China Sea Raid concluded, Admiral Halsey directed his fleet toward the Luzon Strait, adhering to Admiral Nimitz's request. Ultimately, Halsey's aggressive campaign resulted in the destruction of approximately 300,000 tons of Japanese shipping and an estimated 615 Japanese aircraft, all at the expense of 201 American planes.

Returning to the Lingayen Gulf, Wing's offensive operations persisted on January 16. The 63rd, 158th, and 172nd Regiments continued their assaults toward the town of Rosario. However, they encountered fierce resistance from the determined Japanese defenders, which significantly hampered their progress. In contrast, the 169th Regiment achieved a notable advancement by reaching Palacpalac, while the 103rd Regiment successfully captured the strategically important Hill 200 complex. From their newly secured positions, elements of the 103rd Regiment pursued the retreating Japanese forces toward Pozorrubio. Meanwhile, two reinforced companies advanced toward Potpot, and both towns ultimately fell into American hands on January 17.

In a broader strategic context, General Krueger directed General Griswold to dispatch additional troops south of the Agno River in preparation for a decisive push toward Manila. By January 17, the 14th Corps had established outposts at key locations including Moncada, Nampicuan, Anao, and Paniqui, solidifying their control over the area. Simultaneously, Japanese General Nishiyama was preparing to initiate a local counteroffensive by nightfall on January 16. However, the 72nd Regiment's raiding unit was unable to participate due to enemy penetrations disrupting their plans. On the northern front, Sato’s raiding unit conducted a minor raid against an artillery position held by the 158th Regiment, but this attack proved largely inconsequential. In contrast, the raiding unit from the 71st Regiment executed a more impactful maneuver by advancing down the Bued River valley. They successfully infiltrated the rear installations of the 172nd Regiment, where they ignited a gasoline dump, damaging several trucks in the process. This raid resulted in the deaths of two American soldiers and injuries to eight others. At Palacpalac, confusion reigned as the retreating 2nd Battalion of the 64th Regiment inadvertently engaged with the perimeter of the 1st Battalion of the 169th Regiment. This chaotic encounter cost the Japanese approximately 100 men before they retreated in disarray, further illustrating the tumultuous nature of the battlefield.

In a dramatic turn of events, the tank raiding unit launched a surprise attack on the newly established outpost at Potpot. Initially, the first two tanks managed to breach the perimeter, unleashing a barrage of machine-gun fire in all directions as they sped away down the road toward Manaoag. However, the remaining tanks, along with their infantry support, encountered fierce resistance from determined defenders, leading to a sharp and intense fire fight that lasted two hours. Despite their initial success, the attackers were ultimately repelled. As dawn broke, the two tanks that had previously penetrated the defenses returned down the Manaoag road, but this time they met their demise, successfully destroyed by the defenders who had regrouped and fortified their positions. Since the onset of the invasion, the 1st Corps had suffered significant casualties, with approximately 220 men killed and 660 wounded. In stark contrast, Griswold’s forces experienced far lighter losses, with only 30 killed and 90 wounded. With the enemy's counterattack thwarted, the 43rd Division managed to secure positions that effectively reduced the likelihood of another large-scale surprise offensive from the Japanese forces. However, to completely eliminate the remaining threats, Commander Wing recognized the necessity of securing control over the Rosario junction and establishing a solid hold on Route 3 to the south of this critical point.

The challenge was considerable, as Japanese artillery, mortars, and machine guns positioned on the surrounding high ground commanded all approaches to Rosario. Consequently, Wing had no choice but to restrict the 172nd Regiment to a defensive holding action on its left flank while directing its right flank to seize the high ground immediately to the north and northwest of Rosario. In addition, the 63rd and 158th Regiments were tasked with neutralizing the enemy stronghold along the Rosario-Damortis road. To expedite the capture of the road junction, Wing also planned for the 103rd and 169th Regiments to launch an offensive drive north along Route 3. This coordinated effort aimed to strengthen their strategic position and diminish the Japanese threat in the region, ultimately paving the way for a more secure and stable front.

In response to the evolving battlefield situation, General Krueger ultimately ordered General Mullins’ 25th Division to secure the right flank previously held by Wing’s forces. This strategic move prompted the 27th and 161st Regiments to begin the process of relieving the 103rd and 169th Regiments. By doing so, the 6th Division would be able to resume its advance, now directed towards Urdaneta and the Cabaruan Hills, critical areas for the ongoing campaign. To the west, Krueger aimed to maintain the 14th Corps along the Agno River line until General Swift's 1st Corps could effectively neutralize the enemy resistance stretching from Damortis to Urdaneta. This would enable Swift's forces to maneuver southward alongside Griswold's corps. However, General MacArthur was eager to initiate a southern advance toward Manila as soon as possible. Consequently, he instructed the 14th Corps to reposition its main forces back to their previous outpost line south of the Agno by January 20. Following this, the corps was to launch an offensive towards Tarlac and Victoria. Once they established a presence along the Tarlac-Victoria line, the corps would prepare to advance toward Clark Field, a vital objective necessary for the successful neutralization of Japanese strongholds at Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

To bolster this offensive, MacArthur also planned to deploy the 11th Corps on the western coast of Luzon, just north of the Bataan Peninsula. This amphibious operation aimed to disrupt Japanese defensive strategies in the Clark Field area, thereby enhancing the overall effectiveness of the Allied campaign. In contrast, in reaction to the loss of the Hill 200 complex, Japanese General Yamashita ordered the 2nd Tank Division to advance immediately into the Tayug sector. There, Lieutenant-General Iwanaka Yoshiharu would take command of the 10th Division forces already stationed in the region. The armored units were tasked with positioning themselves along the trail north of San Nicolas and on both sides of the Ambayabang River, with the objective of containing any potential enemy advances to the east. Additionally, the Shigemi Detachment received orders to move its main forces from San Manuel to Binalonan, where they were to defend the town resolutely, prepared to hold their ground against any assault.

In addition, General Okamoto was tasked with positioning his main forces to secure the immediate approaches to San Jose. Meanwhile, General Tsuda's 105th Division was instructed to advance northward through Cabanatuan as quickly as possible to establish defensive positions behind the 10th Division, specifically at Minuli and north of Carranglan. However, not all of these strategic plans could be effectively executed. By January 17, Yamashita discovered that the Villa Verde Trail was impassable for tanks and trucks, rendering it unusable for the planned armored movements. Furthermore, the terrain in the Tayug-San Nicolas area proved to be unsuitable for armored operations, complicating the situation further.

On January 17 the 14th Area Army commander belatedly learned that the 10th Division had never concentrated at San Jose and that it had made no real effort to dispose itself along the entire Tayug-Umingan-Lupao-San Jose defense line for which it was responsible. General Okamoto, the division commander, had decided that he did not have sufficient strength to hold the relatively open ground assigned to him. Most of his 39th Regiment was with the Kembu Group; the bulk of the 10th Regiment, greatly understrength, was attached to the 103rd Division for the defense of northern Luzon; and, at least as late as of January 15, he had received no word as to when he might expect the attached Tsuda Detachment to arrive in the San Jose area from the east coast. He had therefore withdrawn most of his troops up Route 5 from San Jose and had started disposing them along the line Yamashita had intended the 105th Division to hold; leaving behind only a reinforced infantry company and two artillery battalions to secure the all-important railhead. Okamoto had directed the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment to remain in the San Nicolas area, and he stationed three or four rifle companies of his 63rd Regiment along the Tayug-Lupao line and in rising ground to the southwest.

Confronted with these unexpected developments, Yamashita concluded that he had no choice but to accept the redeployment of the 10th Division as an established fact. Consequently, he ordered the 2nd Tank Division, which had already begun its movement toward Tayug, to concentrate its main forces southeast of Tayug to safeguard the immediate approaches to San Jose. Additionally, the 6th Tank Regiment was assigned to position itself in Muñoz to cover the southwestern approach to the area. To further bolster defenses, Tsuda was instructed to deploy two of his five advance battalions to San Jose. However, as these tactical adjustments were being made, it became necessary to shift focus away from Luzon and turn attention toward Leyte, where the final operations on the island were unfolding. It is important to note that the majority of General Suzuki’s forces had successfully retreated to the Villaba-Mount Canguipot region, although some strong elements remained isolated further to the east. With General Eichelberger’s 8th Army assuming control of the island, American forces commenced the final phase of operations to secure Leyte, methodically working to eliminate any remaining pockets of resistance.

From January 1 to February 15, the 11th Airborne Division conducted patrols in the Burauen area, where they engaged and successfully eliminated a well-entrenched enemy force positioned on the southern slopes of Mount Majunag. Meanwhile, the 96th Division carried out extensive patrols in the eastern mountainous regions before taking over from the 11th Airborne Division. In the southern part of the island, the 7th Division launched numerous patrols and deployed a reinforced battalion that effectively neutralized all enemy forces in the Camotes Islands. Additionally, the 77th Division focused on clearing various pockets of enemy resistance located in northwestern Leyte.

By late January, the Americal Division arrived to assist in the cleanup operations in Samar and Leyte, a mission that was successfully completed by February 24, with support from the 1st Filipino Regiment. However, during this time, Japanese General Suzuki was formulating his strategy for Operation Chi-Go. This operation involved the amphibious movement of several military units to different islands within the Visayas using large motorized landing barges. Suzuki's initial plan entailed deploying the majority of the 1st Division to establish a garrison on Cebu Island, while the headquarters of the 35th Army was to relocate to Davao. This strategic move would enable him to take direct command of military operations on Mindanao. Following this, he intended to dispatch the 41st and 77th Regiments to Mindanao, assign the 26th Division to the Bacolod area on Negros Island, and send the 5th Regiment along with units from the 102nd Division to Cebu. Furthermore, the 16th Division and the 68th Brigade, commanded by General Makino, were to remain in Leyte to engage in guerrilla warfare tactics.

The 102nd Division presented certain difficulties. There had been instances of 40 to 50 deserters fleeing to Cebu or Negros on boats they had built for themselves. Deserters that were apprehended were court-martialed. General Suzuki for some time had been out of touch with General Fukei, the commanding general of the 102nd Division, which was in the Mt. Pina area. By chance, one of Suzuki's officers learned that Fukei was planning to evacuate to Cebu. Suzuki was incensed since he and his staff felt that Fukei "was violating the military code in taking these steps without consent." He therefore ordered Fukei to remain at Leyte. Fukei did not answer but his chief of staff sent the following reply: "We appreciate the efforts of Army but at the present time we are very busy preparing for retreat. The division commander and chief of staff are unable to report to Army Headquarters." Suzuki was "entirely displeased" with the reaction of Fukei and sent his chief of staff, General Tomochika, to investigate the situation. When Tomochika arrived he found that Fukei, with his chief of staff and some headquarters personnel, had already left for Cebu. The sequel to these events was that Suzuki relieved Fukei of his command and ordered him to remain on Cebu until he received further orders. Upon the arrival of Suzuki in Cebu in the spring of 1945, Fukei was sentenced to confinement for thirty days. Suzuki asked IGHQ in Tokyo for authority to court-martial Fukei but no reply was forthcoming. In the end, Fukei was released and later returned to command of the 102nd Division.

In the midst of ongoing military operations, Suzuki implemented measures to ensure that the forces stationed on Leyte could sustain themselves. He instructed his troops to make the most of local resources by utilizing available food and materials. This included directives to cultivate sweet potatoes and Indian corn, with the hope of sourcing all necessary provisions from the surrounding areas outside their operational base. However, the Japanese forces faced significant challenges due to relentless American air raids and mop-up operations, which severely hindered their ability to procure supplies. The hostile environment made it difficult for them to plant and harvest the crops they had intended to grow. Despite these obstacles, the Japanese managed to capitalize on the conclusion of the harvest season. They were able to secure substantial amounts of food that had been stored by local Filipinos, including a considerable quantity of coconuts and sweet potatoes. By early January, the 1st Division began its gradual movement toward Cebu, successfully transporting around 800 men to the island by mid-January. Unfortunately, the situation worsened as enemy PT boats established a stringent sea blockade, rendering maritime transportation impractical until mid-March. This blockade left approximately 2,000 men from the 1st Division, along with other units of the 35th Army, stranded on Leyte.

Simultaneously, the Imahori Detachment, alongside the Mitsui Shipping Unit and the 77th Regiment, advanced to the southern Matag-ob area and subsequently moved toward Villaba, reaching their destination in early February. The majority of the 26th Division also made progress, arriving in the region north of Ormoc in mid-January before commencing a northwestward movement. By February, they successfully established contact with the rest of the 35th Army. Meanwhile, the remnants of the 16th Division could only reach the Valencia area in February, where they would remain until the end of the month. For the foreseeable future, the Japanese units left behind on Leyte faced the daunting task of defending against the advancing Americal Division and the 1st Filipino Regiment, which were steadily gaining ground.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Admiral Halsey launched Operation Gratitude, targeting Japanese shipping. Despite misleading intel, they decimated enemy convoys, showcasing the effectiveness of airstrikes and securing strategic advances in Luzon. American forces advanced through Luzon while Task Force 38 struck Formosa and Hong Kong. Despite fierce Japanese resistance and challenging weather, the Allies steadily gained ground, though both sides suffered significant losses in the campaign.

- 165 - Pacific War Podcast - South China Sea Raid - January 14 - 21 , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week