Last time we spoke about the fall of Myitkyina. By late July 1944, the Japanese at Myitkyina in northern Burma were facing severe challenges. Despite holding out through a long siege, they were cut off from supplies and suffering heavy casualties. A leadership conflict between Colonel Maruyama and General Minakami further complicated things. Maruyama defended the city intensely, while Minakami aimed to deny Allied access to strategic roads. With depleted forces, including wounded troops trying to escape via the Irrawaddy River, the Japanese defense weakened. Allied forces, reinforced and ready, made significant gains, shrinking Japanese-held areas. On August 1, Minakami agreed to withdraw, and the remaining Japanese began escaping across the river. The Allies launched a final attack, securing Myitkyina on August 3. The 10 week siege resulted in substantial casualties on both sides. This victory allowed the Allies to improve logistical routes and marked a critical point in the Burma campaign.

This episode is the Battle of the Driniumor River

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

Last time we were seeing action kick up at the Driniumor River. While the Japanese offensive had initially been successful, General Hall's forces managed to halt the enemy advance and reform their river line by July 15, despite a 1500-yard gap in the center. The Japanese were aware of this weakness in the American lines and exploited it, especially during the night. However, Colonel Starr's 3rd Battalion patrolled this area and occasionally engaged the enemy, killing 135 Japanese on the night of July 14. Despite this, General Cunningham claimed that his South Force had extended its lines nearly 1000 yards beyond its assigned sector without encountering any elements of the 124th Regiment. Consequently, on July 15, Starr concluded that his regiment had not advanced as far south as previously reported and ordered his units to adjust their lines southward and extend their defenses up the Driniumor towards Cunningham's Troop E. The following morning, Starr's 3rd Battalion began moving south to close the gap. As they reached the area by nightfall, Troop E was attacked by two companies of the 1st Battalion, 239th Regiment. While the cavalrymen sought cover, Starr's 3rd Battalion was also attacked by Colonel Nara's 3rd Battalion, which had turned south after its defeat at the Paup villages. This split the American forces in two, with Companies L and M pushing south through increasing opposition to reach South Force lines, while Companies I and K dug in for the night in their current positions. Despite the intense fighting, several Japanese were killed, and the gap was reduced to 500 yards.

In the course of the day's fighting the Coastal Attack Force had lost all its artillery and had suffered heavy casualties. Additional losses were sustained on succeeding days, but Major Hoshino and his men were not completely removed as an irritant until the night of 16-17 July. During that night remnants of the Coastal Attack Force, about thirty-five men strong, attacked North Force and 124th Infantry command post installations at Anamo. At 23:00 the group charged out of the jungle southwest of the Anamo perimeter. Repulsed by machine gun fire, the enemy temporarily disappeared, only to reappear at 03:00 on 17 July moving west against Anamo along the beach. Machine gun fire from the American positions broke up this second attack, but about ten minutes later the Japanese tried again, this time moving on Anamo from the north by wading in from the sea. Once ashore, Major Hoshino's men broke up into small groups, attempting to destroy mechanized equipment, automatic weapons positions, and communications installations. The Coastal Attack Force remnants had apparently scouted well, for they were reported to have moved purposefully toward the most important installations and they easily found their way about in terrain they had vacated only four days previously. Whatever Major Hoshino's plans were, they were not realized. About forty of his men were killed and the rest dispersed.

Behind them, Hall dispatched Colonel Howe’s 1st and 2nd Battalions to clear the remaining enemy units west of the Driniumor River. Over two days of complex and sometimes uncoordinated company actions, the Americans successfully overran Nara’s stragglers in the area. Further south, as Japanese troops were seen crossing the Driniumor at a fording point about 2,500 yards south of Afua, Cunningham sent Troop A south to high ground behind the Driniumor to halt the Japanese movements westwards. There, the 78th and 80th Regiments, under Major-General Miyake Sadahiko, were assembling for a renewed offensive. Adachi’s new plan involved Miyake striking Afua from the south while the 239th Regiment prepared to move against the Kawanaka Shima area. Additionally, the retreating 237th Regiment and the reserve 66th Regiment were ordered south to join future attacks by the 20th Division, though they wouldn’t arrive until July 25. As the Miyake Force maneuvered into position to the right and rear of Cunningham’s 1st Squadron, Starr struggled to close the gap in the center, which was eventually sealed on the morning of July 18. That night, Miyake launched an attack with two battalions on the 1st Squadron's command post and the adjacent perimeter held by Troop A, successfully pushing them 250 yards to the northeast.

Early in the afternoon of 19 July fresh Japanese units began to surround the Troop A position, moving in from the north, northwest, west, and southwest. The 1st Squadron commander called for artillery fire to break up this enemy maneuver. Upon cessation of the fire, Troop A attacked to the south and west for a second time. Driving at least a company of Japanese before it, the troop pushed 600 yards southwest of its original positions astride the Afua-Palauru trail and temporarily disrupted enemy plans to seize the position. About 140 Japanese had been killed during the two days' operation around Troop A. South Force, at the same time, lost 8 men killed and 29 wounded, all from the 1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry. There were strong indications that more attacks might occur in the 1st Squadron area, but Troop A was not destined to take part in any of these actions. It was replaced on the 21st by Troop C.

Following this victory on July 21, Troop C relieved the battered Troop A, Howe’s battalions successfully set up a patrol base on the East Branch of Koronal Creek, and Starr’s 2nd Battalion moved to Palauru to provide additional outer security southwest of the airfield. On July 19, the first elements of General Wing’s 43rd Division began landing at Aitape, with the 2nd Battalion, 169th Regiment subsequently taking over about 1,000 yards of the river line on the right of the 124th Regiment by July 22. Meanwhile, Adachi ordered the still-reorganizing Miyake Force to attack Afua from the north and west while General Nakai’s 79th Regiment crossed the Driniumor and attacked from the south. On the evening of July 21, Miyake launched his attack on Troop C’s position, successfully cutting it off from the rest of South Force. While the cavalrymen resisted heavy Japanese attacks, Miyake’s units also repelled Cunningham’s attempts to relieve the beleaguered troop over the next few days. Not knowing what other plans the Japanese might have in mind, General Cunningham was unwilling to pull any more troops away from the river defenses. Moreover, he now considered the position of his right flank untenable. He therefore withdrew Troop B north of Afua about 1,000 yards and used the unit to form a new defense line which ran westward about 500 yards from Troop A's right flank, anchored on the Driniumor. South Force's right flank was now refused and additional protection had been secured for medical, supply, and command post installations at the dropping ground banana patch. Troop C was left isolated behind Japanese lines, and Afua was again released to the enemy.

It was not until the night of 21-22 July that the Japanese forward units were able to organize for any sort of attack. During that night, elements of the 124th Infantry received considerable mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire from east of the Driniumor. This fire increased the next morning, and about noon the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, was attacked from the west by elements of the 237th Infantry. The first Japanese attack was ". . . finally broken up by a bayonet charge . . ." conducted by elements of the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, but other attacks followed as troops of the 1st Battalion, 239th Infantry, tried to move across the Driniumor from the east, striking both the 124th Infantry's unit and part of the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry. Before dark on the 22d, the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, counted 155 new Japanese dead in its area. That unit and the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, reported their own losses as five killed and twenty-five wounded.

The 1st Battalion, 239th Regiment made further unsuccessful attempts to reopen the river crossing. By July 25, Adachi decided to send the 41st Division south to assist in the southern effort. After the fall of Afua, Hall ordered Howe’s battalions to leave their East Branch base and reinforce Cunningham’s South Force, arriving at the new line by July 23. With these reinforcements, Cunningham decided early in the afternoon to send Troops A and B to attack west toward Troop C while Howe’s 2nd Battalion pushed southeast toward the isolated troop. Despite being uncoordinated, the infantry successfully moved into Troop C's perimeter from the northwest and helped repel a heavy Japanese attack from the southwest, while the cavalry troops reoccupied Afua and established new defensive positions. However, American attempts to break out on July 24 were unsuccessful due to the Japanese defending all tracks, trails, and ridgelines in the heavily jungled ground northeast of the perimeter. On July 25, Howe’s Companies E and B unexpectedly established contact about 500 yards north of the besieged forces against light resistance, allowing the battered Troop C to withdraw. With Troop C relieved, Howe’s units continued to attack south and west towards the Afua-Palauru trail, successfully pushing the Japanese into the Torricelli Mountains.

Many Japanese troops remained positioned in a triangular area bounded by the dropping ground, Afua, and Company G's ridgeline position, where they continued to harass Cunningham’s forces. Rifle fire, intensifying as darkness approached, harassed the rear and right flank of the two battalions, and the Japanese began intermittently to drop light artillery or mortar shells into the banana patch area, where the command posts of South Force, the 112th Cavalry, and the 127th Infantry were now located. Finally, Japanese patrols, coming in from the west, had scouted the banana patch area during the day, action which seemed to presage an enemy attack during the night. To get out of range of the enemy fire and danger of enemy attack, General Cunningham moved the command post installations 500 yards to the north before dark. Additionally, 127th Infantry patrols had found a Japanese map which indicated that the 66th Infantry, 51st Division, was concentrating in the Kwamagnirk area. Indeed, the 66th Infantry, which, with attached units, was at least 1,000 men strong, had crossed the Driniumor on or about 24 July. Bypassing the right flank of South Force, the regiment had moved into the heavily jungled high ground west of the banana patch and dropping ground. In addition, the remnants of the 237th Infantry, probably about 300 men strong, had finally arrived in the Afua area on 25 July and had passed to the control of the Miyake Force. Rear elements of the 20th Division, including additional men from the 26th Field Artillery and engineer units, had also crossed the Driniumor south of Afua. The number of Japanese troops in the South Force area by nightfall on the 26th of July was at least 2,500 and may have been over 3,000.

On July 27, the battalion launched a successful southward attack, but ongoing Japanese movements to the west eventually necessitated an American withdrawal, despite other units under Cunningham managing to repel enemy advances. The following day, Cunningham consolidated his positions to bolster defenses in anticipation of potential large-scale Japanese assaults. However, on July 29, efforts by the 1st Squadron and the 2nd Battalion to attack south and west into the Triangle were thwarted by determined Japanese defenders led by Adachi. As a result, only localized patrol actions were conducted on July 30 and 31, as Cunningham devised plans for another offensive into the Triangle.

Major combat activity revolved around the withdrawal of Company G, 127th Infantry, from its exposed outpost west of Afua. On the afternoon of the 29th the unit had been driven more than 400 yards east of its original position by Japanese attacks and had established new defenses on high ground about 300 yards west of Afua. On the 30th the company was surrounded and spent all day fighting off a series of small-scale attacks. The next morning it fought its way north to the dropping ground, where it arrived about 1330. Thence, it moved on to the Driniumor and joined the rest of the 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, which had switched positions with the 3d Battalion. During the period from 13 to 31 July, South Force had suffered almost 1,000 casualties, of which 260 had been incurred by the 112th Cavalry. For the understrength cavalry regiment, this was a casualty rate of over 17 percent. The 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, had also lost heavily and was in need of rest, reorganization, and re-equipment--needs which had prompted General Cunningham to change the places of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 127th Infantry. South Force casualties were as follows: 106 killed, 386 wounded, 18 missing, and 426 evacuated as a result of disease and sickness. South Force estimated that it had killed over 700 Japanese. By the end of July, with the arrival of most of the 41st Division, Adachi believed he had amassed enough reinforcements near Afua to launch a final offensive.

The 238th Regiment, the 41st Mountain Artillery, and the 8th Independent Engineers were across the river in time by the 30th but the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 239th Regiment, had missed the crossing point on the Driniumor and were lost. Fortunately for the 18th Army, the South Force withdrawals on July 29 and 30 gave the 20th and 41st Divisions time to complete their organization. New orders were issued for the attack to start on August 1, with the 20th Division on the west and the 41st Division on the east. The strength that the 20th Division could muster for the attack was a little over 2000 men. Most of these troops had been without food for some time. They were suffering from starvation, malaria, and skin diseases, and morale was cracking. They were short of both ammunition and weapons. The 41st Division and its attached units, totaling nearly 1750 men by the morning of August 1, were in equally bad shape. Nevertheless, General Adachi was determined to make one last attack with the nearly 4000 troops now available to him in the Afua area.

Despite sensing minimal Japanese resistance to the north, Hall was eager to mount a robust counteroffensive against the 18th Army. The 2d Battalion, 124th Infantry, which had been patrolling in the Palauru-Chinapelli area, was relieved from that duty by the 1st Battalion, 169th Infantry, and on the 30th joined its regiment at the Driniumor. The 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, was already at the river. Tactical control of the counteroffensive was vested in Col. Edward M. Starr, commanding officer of the 124th Infantry, whose counterattack organization was to be known as TED Force. The 1st Battalion, 124th Infantry, was commanded by Maj. Ralph D. Burns; the 2d Battalion by Lt. Col. Robert M. Fowler; the 3d Battalion by Lt. Col. George D. Williams; and the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, by Maj. William F. Lewis. To avoid confusion, the four battalions were referred to by the last names of their commanders rather than by their number designations. Fowler's battalion, attacking along the coast, was to be supplied by ration trains moving along the coastal trail from Anamo. The rest of TED Force, pushing through trackless, dense jungle, was to be supplied by airdrop. The 149th Field Artillery Battalion, augmented by the Cannon Company, 124th Infantry, was responsible for artillery support, but when necessary the 129th Field Artillery was to add its fire to that of the 149th. All the artillery units were emplaced on the beach west of the Driniumor's mouth. The positions which the 124th Infantry and the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, left vacant on the Driniumor were to be occupied by the 2d and 3d Battalions, 128th Infantry. Colonel Starr had succeeded General Stark as commander of North Force on 18 July when the arrival of elements of the 43d Division at Aitape made it necessary for General Stark, the assistant division commander, to move back to BLUE Beach for administrative duties. General Stark apparently also reassumed command of the Western Sector, in place of General Hutchinson, Assistant Division Commander, 31st Division, who had rejoined his division when it, less the 124th Infantry, moved to a new operational area in western New Guinea. When TED Force was organized, North Force as such apparently ceased to exist, and the 128th Infantry took over the defensive functions previously assigned to North Force on the Driniumor. The name TED Force originated from the diminutive for Colonel Starr's first name. There were always so many units from different divisions and regiments operating along the Driniumor that the task force usually found it more convenient to use names rather than numbers for unit designations. The names, usually derived from the commanding officers, served not only to lessen confusion but also did double duty as code names.

The attack was to be carried out with three battalions abreast along a front of 3,000 yards, and the fourth in reserve and in position to protect the right flank of the advancing force. The four battalions were to move east to the line of Niumen Creek, destroying all enemy found between that stream and the Driniumor within the 3,000-yard-wide zone of responsibility. Upon their arrival on the Niumen the battalions were to reorganize and prepare for further advances either east or south upon orders from General Hall. All three battalions of the 124th Infantry began crossing the Driniumor on schedule at 0800, 31 July, moving into terrain concerning which only incomplete and sometimes inaccurate information was available. The 1st Battalion faced delays from enemy delaying actions but eventually reached the creek by August 1, while the remaining battalions advanced inland, also reaching Niumen successfully.

The 1st Battalion’s advance company had been held up about 800 yards east of the Driniumor by elements of the 1st Battalion, 239th Infantry, which had been left along the river when the rest of that Japanese regiment had moved south to Afua on 26 July. Burns' men continued to encounter strong opposition from 239th Infantry elements throughout the day and did not break off contact until 1730, when the battalion bivouacked for the night still 800 yards west of Niumen Creek. Company A had become separated during the day and remained some 550 yards northwest of the main body for the night. Both sections of the battalion were out of touch with the rest of TED Force. The 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry (Williams), crossed the Driniumor at a point about 3,000 yards inland and reached the Niumen about 1400, having encountered only scattered rifle fire. Lewis' 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, which followed Williams' command, made no contact with the enemy and bivouacked for the night about 500 yards west of Williams. All battalions spent the next day, 1 August, consolidating and patrolling along Neumen Creek, and Burns' unit moved up into line with the others.

Meanwhile, Cunningham planned his own offensive aimed at dismantling the Triangle position following a reconnaissance mission along the Afua-Palauru trail. However, preliminary actions were disrupted when two companies launched a surprise attack from the southwest against Troop C's lines at 06:20 on August 1. General Cunningham immediately canceled the planned reconnaissance in force into the triangle area and turned his attention to this new threat. The first Japanese assault units were quickly reinforced, and the enemy moved forward against Troop C in massed waves along a narrow front. A bloody battle ensued as the enemy, apparently determined to commit suicide, continued his mass attacks. South Force called for artillery support, which was quickly forthcoming and which greatly helped Troop C to throw back the enemy assaults. By 0800 the Japanese had withdrawn and the battle area had become strangely quiet. Patrols were sent out from the cavalry perimeter to reconnoiter. These parties counted 180 dead Japanese in front of Troop C's lines, and it was considered probable that the enemy had carried off many more dead and wounded. Troop C, on the other hand, had lost but 5 men killed and 6 wounded. Examination of the enemy dead disclosed that elements of both the 80th and 238th Infantry Regiments had participated in the attacks. Thirty minutes later, Cunningham proceeded with his reconnaissance mission, encountering minimal resistance before returning in the afternoon. Despite capturing documents indicating an impending major assault, Cunningham deployed the 2nd Squadron as a mobile reserve at his command post.

Although the movement of the 2d Squadron had apparently been well advised, the Japanese did not attack the command post area. Instead, at 1900, elements of the 41st Division struck the 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, at its lines south of the dropping ground. This attack was preceded by fire from a 70-mm. or 75-mm. artillery piece which the Japanese had managed to sneak into the area within 150 yards of Company B, 127th Infantry. Following a few rounds from this weapon, Japanese infantry charged forward in four separate waves, employing perhaps 300 men on a very narrow front. Few of the enemy got near Company B's positions, for the attack was thrown back with artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire, which caused heavy losses among the enemy forces. By 2030, action in the dropping ground area stopped for the night. During the early hours of the next morning, 3 August, the 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, again heard enemy activity to its front, and about 0730 a small Japanese party struck between Companies A and C. This attack was quickly repulsed, principally by mortar fire from 1st Battalion units. By noon all activity in the 1st Battalion area had ceased, and the Japanese had withdrawn to the southwest.

Concurrently, Cunningham’s 1st Squadron faced attacks from Nakai’s 20th Division, but their suicidal charges were also turned back by resilient defenders. The 1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry, on the left rear of the 1st Battalion, was attacked by another group of Japanese at 1945. This action was probably meant to have been coordinated with the attack on Company B, but, if this were the enemy's intention, something had gone wrong. Apparently there had also been some mix-up in unit dispositions, for both enemy efforts had entailed the use of elements of the 78th, 80th, and 238th Infantry Regiments. After the day's action was finished, the combined effective strength of the first two units was probably not more than 250 men, and the 2d Battalion, 238th Infantry, was practically wiped out. The desperate attacks during the day had been carried out with a complete disregard for self-preservation, and had probably cost the Japanese 300 men killed and at least twice that number wounded.

TED Force was subsequently directed to advance south along Niumen Creek toward the Torricelli Mountains foothills to disrupt Adachi’s supply lines and flank the 18th Army. Supply challenges and dense jungle terrain initially delayed Starr’s southern movement, with his northern battalions only linking up with the southern ones by day's end. The next morning, Starr launched a southward offensive, immediately encountering fierce resistance from the 1st Battalion, 239th Regiment, which held a stubborn defense throughout the day. In response, Starr ordered his 1st Battalion to bypass the engagement and move southwest, advancing unopposed for up to 1000 yards. August 3rd proved relatively calm for Cunningham, as the 1st Battalion, 169th Regiment arrived to bolster the South Force perimeter. However, vigilance remained high in anticipation of Mano’s impending final assault.

On 1 August General Adachi learned that American forces were active in the Yakamul area. It was erroneously reported to him that this was an amphibious operation, a maneuver which the 18th Army commander had feared for some time (actually, the report referred to patrolling by the 2d Battalion, 124th Infantry, along the coast from the mouth of Niumen Creek). He therefore ordered the remaining elements of the 237th Infantry to extricate themselves from the operations in the Afua area and hurry back to Yakamul to reinforce service units in that vicinity. Events moved so rapidly that the remnants of the 237th Infantry never got to Yakamul. Instead, the advance of TED Force made it necessary for General Adachi to change his plans and accelerate a general withdrawal. Communications within forward units of the 18th Army had so broken down that it was not until 3 August that General Adachi learned of the TED Force movement across the Driniumor, although the 1st Battalion, 239th Infantry, had been in contact with TED Force since 31 July. When General Adachi did hear of the American movement, he grossly underestimated the strength of TED Force. Thinking that the American operation was being carried out by only 400 troops, General Adachi merely changed the orders of the 237th Infantry and instructed that regiment to hold the 18th Army's crossing point on the upper Niumen Creek. On the same day, 3 August, General Adachi issued detailed plans for the withdrawal of all 18th Army units to the east side of the Driniumor, a withdrawal which was to begin on 4 or 5 August. The 66th Infantry, 51st Division, was to protect the 20th and 41st Division units as they crossed the Driniumor. The continued advance of TED Force on 3 August prompted General Adachi to change his plans and early on the 4th he ordered the 20th Division to start retreating at noon that day and the 41st Division to break contact on the 5th.

The following morning, elements of the 238th and 239th Regiments emerged from the jungle southwest of the 1st Squadron in a final, desperate charge. Violent action continued in front of the 1st Squadron for about two hours, during which time nearly 200 Japanese were killed at the very edge of the squadron perimeter, principally by machine gun and rifle fire. How many more of the enemy were killed by artillery and mortar fire during the period cannot be estimated, but the banzai tactics undoubtedly cost the Japanese more than the 200 dead counted in front of the 1st Squadron which, in the same two hours, lost only 3 men killed and 4 wounded. By 0900 the last enemy attacks had ceased and the remaining Japanese had withdrawn generally to the south.

Following the enemy withdrawal, Troop E pursued the retreating Japanese southward, encountering sporadic rifle fire as they eliminated remaining stragglers. The terrain encountered on August 4 and subsequent days during the operations of the TED Force east of the Driniumor proved next to impassable. Dense jungle undergrowth covered the ground; the area was thick with heavy rain forest; low but knifelike ridges, separated from each other by deep gullies, were encountered; and swampy spots were plentiful. To add to the difficulties, rain fell during the day--a downpour which turned much of the ground into a quagmire and flooded many dry stream beds. A few new, rough trails, recently cut by the Japanese, were found, but mud made them nearly useless as routes of advance. Low clouds coming in from the Torricelli Mountains to the south prevented ration and ammunition drops and increased communication difficulties. Battalions ran low on drinking water, for weather conditions prevented resupply of water purification tablets and the assault companies had neither time nor equipment to clean water by other means. Radio communication between battalions, from battalions to TED Force headquarters, and from the latter to higher echelons was nearly nonexistent, for the heavy jungle and the damp weather cut down the efficiency of all radio equipment.

It had been hoped that the advance on the 4th would carry TED Force south to the main Japanese supply route, but the trail reached by Burns', Lewis', and Williams' battalions was another route which had not been used by military traffic for some time. Possibly, it was a section of the native trail to Afua and, as such, purposely avoided by the Japanese inasmuch as parts of it could be seen from the air. In any case, the track cut on the 4th lay about 1,200 yards north of the east-west trail which most of the Japanese forces moving to and from the Afua area had been using. Colonel Starr, realizing that the main Japanese supply route had not yet been severed, ordered his units to continue southward on the 5th, on which day the advance was resumed about 0800 hours with Williams leading and Lewis' battalion about 400 yards to the rear. Pushing south along now precipitous and mountainous banks of the upper Niumen, Williams' unit was opposed by only scattered rifle fire until 1100, when it was decisively halted by a strong Japanese force conducting a stubborn defense. On August 5, learning that TED Force was approaching the point at which the 18th Army's main line of communications crossed the upper reaches of Niumen Creek, General Adachi had also ordered the 8th Independent Engineers to aid the remnants of the 237th Infantry in holding the crossing point. It was this combined 237th Infantry-8th Engineers force that Williams' 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, had encountered about 1100 on 5 August. The composite Japanese unit was dug in along a 1,000-foot high ridge across Williams' line of advance and threatened to outflank the battalion by occupying other high ground nearby. Despite artillery and mortar support, Williams' men were unable to advance. Colonel Starr ordered Lewis' unit to bypass the fight and continue south to locate and cut the Japanese main supply route. Fighting at Williams' front continued through most of the afternoon, and Colonel Starr realized that the Japanese force could not be dislodged that day. Fowlers' battalion was brought up to the rear of Williams' and late in the afternoon set up a new perimeter with the regimental command post. Before dark, Williams' men withdrew slightly from their most forward positions so that artillery concentrations could be placed along the front. Lewis' unit, which had moved off to the southeast to bypass Williams' fight, made little progress in very rough terrain and was cut off from the rest of TED Force before it could swing westward.

Meanwhile, another battalion to the west encountered minimal resistance as it intercepted the main enemy trail east of the Driniumor, linking up with patrols from Cunningham’s 2nd Squadron. Action on the 6th started earlier than TED Force expected. About 0300 approximately 400 Japanese attacked Williams' perimeter. This enemy force comprised elements of the 41st Division, supported by men of the 26th Field Artillery of the 20th Division and some remnants of the 8th Independent Engineers. Attacking under cover of fire from machine guns, mortars, and 75-mm. mountain guns, the Japanese force was attempting to secure fords over the upper reaches of Niumen Creek and protect the withdrawal of other elements of 18th Army units from Afua. Though surprised, Williams' men held back the initial onslaught. Reportedly, Japanese riflemen then climbed trees surrounding Williams' perimeter to pin down the American troops while other Japanese continued to attack on the ground.

Fowler's unit, under orders to bypass Williams' fight and move around the enemy left, started moving about 0800 hours but soon found the terrain made it impossible to avoid contact with the Japanese opposing Williams. The Japanese, having control of most commanding ground in the area, stopped Fowler's leading company. Action was not rapid. The terrain made all movements slow and laborious, and much time had to be taken to co-ordinate artillery support fire properly. Under cover of artillery fire, another company of Fowler's battalion, creeping slowly through ravines and up an almost vertical cliff, worked around to unoccupied high ground on the Japanese left. The rest of the battalion was successfully disengaged to secure more commanding terrain in the same area. The Japanese, finding themselves outflanked and subjected to increasingly heavy artillery and mortar fire, began to withdraw southward in midafternoon, relieving the pressure on Williams' front. Fowler's battalion, in enveloping the Japanese left, had moved north and then westward and the maneuver had carried the unit by dark to a point just north of the main trail about 750 yards east of Burns' battalion. Williams' men withdrew to reorganize, after disengaging from the enemy forces late in the afternoon; at dark, having resumed the march westward, they secured high ground north of the trail. The ground covered during the day by Williams' battalion was little more than 500 yards west of the position it had occupied the previous night. The unit probably could have moved farther, but Colonel Starr halted it so as not to increase the distance from Lewis' battalion which was, in effect, lost. The unit had laboriously struggled over extremely rough and trackless ground during the day, fighting in the afternoon against a number of Japanese who had withdrawn from Williams' front. For the night, Lewis' men set up a perimeter about 800 yards south-southeast of the scene of Williams' fighting. With Adachi’s escape route blocked, Starr’s battalions advanced southwestward, achieving notable success by killing around 500 Japanese soldiers between August 6 and 7.

In the interim, Cunningham’s South Force completed operations in their sector, achieving a successful attack led by Howe that ousted the remaining disorganized Japanese presence from Afua on August 6. Two days later, the 124th Regiment advanced to the Driniumor, claiming to have eliminated approximately 1800 Japanese soldiers since the start of their counteroffensive, at the cost of 50 men killed and 80 wounded. With the rest of Adachi’s 18th Army retreating towards Wewak, General Gill declared Afua secure by the evening of August 9. Following the conclusion of the Battle of the Driniumor River, the fatigued units of the 32nd Division, including the 124th Regiment and 112th Cavalry Regiment, were relieved by units from Wing’s 43rd Division. From August 16 to 25, Wing’s regiments conducted final combat missions in the Aitape region, encountering minimal Japanese resistance east of the Driniumor, except for delaying actions near the mouth of the Dandriwad River by patrols of the 103rd Regiment. Consequently, General Krueger declared the Aitape operation concluded on August 25, confident that the 18th Army posed no further threat to the Tadji airstrips. Adachi’s forces had indeed suffered a decisive and costly defeat, rendering them incapable of posing a significant threat to Allied forces anywhere in New Guinea. The campaign to secure the Aitape area and defeat the 18th Army resulted in approximately 440 Allied soldiers killed, 2550 wounded, and 10 missing, while inflicting losses of around 8821 Japanese killed and 98 captured, including 2669 killed and 34 taken prisoner from August 2 to 9 alone. Adachi himself reported losing 9000 men and virtually annihilating seven regiments.

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The American forces under Hall and Cunningham repelled multiple fierce Japanese offensives, inflicting heavy casualties. Despite a lot of setbacks and logistical challenges, TED Force advanced southward, disrupting Japanese supply lines and forcing their withdrawal by early August. Casualties were significant on both sides, underscoring the fierce nature of fighting on Green Hell.

- 144 - Pacific War Podcast - Battle of the Driniumor River - August 26, 1944

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