xlr8harder writes:

In general I don’t think an uploaded mind is you, but rather a copy. But one thought experiment makes me question this. A Ship of Theseus concept where individual neurons are replaced one at a time with a nanotechnological functional equivalent.

Are you still you?

Presumably the question xlr8harder cares about here isn't semantic question of how linguistic communities use the word "you", or predictions about how whole-brain emulation tech might change the way we use pronouns.

Rather, I assume xlr8harder cares about more substantive questions like:

If I expect to be uploaded tomorrow, should I care about the upload in the same ways (and to the same degree) that I care about my future biological self?
Should I anticipate experiencing what my upload experiences?
If the scanning and uploading process requires destroying my biological brain, should I say yes to the procedure?

My answers:

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Outline:
(05:02) Why Humans Feel Like They Persist
(10:12) Sleep and Film Reels
(14:17) Weird-Futuristic-Technology Anxiety
(16:20) To Change Experience, You Have to Change Physics, Not Just Metaphysics
(18:35) ... And You Cant Change Experience With Just Any Old Change to Physics
(22:59) Having Multiple Futures
The original text contained 1 footnote which was omitted from this narration.
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First published:
April 17th, 2024

Source:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/zPM5r3RjossttDrpw/when-is-a-mind-me
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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.

“When is a mind me?” by Rob Bensinger

LessWrong (30+ Karma)